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Preface	  and	  Acknowledgements	  
	   In	  the	  summer	  of	  2012,	  I	  traveled	  to	  Israel	  for	  10	  days	  alongside	  dozens	  of	  
fellow	  University	  of	  Michigan	  cohorts	  through	  a	  program	  called	  Taglit-­‐Birthright.	  As	  
it	  was	  for	  many	  of	  the	  Jews	  who	  have	  participated	  in	  the	  all-­‐expenses-­‐paid	  
experience,	  the	  trip	  was	  eye-­‐opening,	  enriching,	  and	  at	  times,	  overwhelming.	  Never	  
before	  had	  I	  been	  to	  a	  place	  where	  the	  people	  were	  so	  collectively	  affected	  by	  their	  
history.	  Israel	  is	  merely	  a	  small	  strip	  of	  desert	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  roughly	  the	  size	  of	  
New	  Jersey,	  but	  every	  site	  there	  has	  a	  story,	  and	  some	  stories	  date	  back	  thousands	  
of	  years.	  When	  we	  visited	  the	  Western	  Wall	  in	  Jerusalem,	  I	  met	  a	  middle-­‐aged	  
European	  Jew	  visiting	  Israel	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  After	  saying	  a	  prayer	  and	  stuffing	  a	  
note	  between	  the	  ancient	  stones,	  as	  countless	  others	  have	  done,	  he	  held	  his	  cell	  
phone	  up	  against	  the	  wall	  so	  a	  loved	  one	  could	  say	  a	  prayer	  from	  back	  home.	  That	  
image	  presented	  a	  powerful	  mix	  of	  ancient	  history	  and	  modernity,	  and	  one	  that	  
struck	  me	  as	  particularly	  epitomical	  of	  many	  sites	  in	  Israel	  today.	  Like	  other	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  participants	  who	  hadn’t	  given	  Israel	  much	  thought	  before	  the	  trip,	  I	  
unexpectedly	  found	  myself	  overcome	  with	  emotion	  when	  we	  visited	  sites	  like	  the	  
Western	  Wall,	  Mount	  Herzl,	  Independence	  Hall,	  and	  Mount	  Masada.	  Suddenly	  Israel	  
felt	  like	  home,	  perhaps	  because	  it	  was	  home	  for	  my	  ancestors.	  Indeed,	  the	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  program	  stresses	  to	  participants	  that	  Israel	  is	  the	  one	  place	  that	  every	  
Jew	  can	  call	  home.	  
	   After	  the	  trip,	  I	  wondered	  what	  some	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  newfound	  
feelings	  are.	  Upon	  doing	  some	  initial	  research,	  I	  found	  that	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  trip	  
participants	  feel	  the	  same	  way	  I	  do	  —	  more	  connected	  with	  Israel	  and	  with	  Judaism	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—	  and	  I	  will	  discuss	  those	  studies	  in	  the	  review	  of	  literature	  that	  follows.	  But	  as	  a	  
political	  science	  student,	  and	  as	  someone	  who	  suddenly	  found	  himself	  much	  more	  
engaged	  with	  current	  events	  surrounding	  Israel	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Middle	  East,	  I	  
was	  disappointed	  to	  find	  that	  literature	  regarding	  how	  these	  trips	  affect	  young	  
American	  Jews	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  is	  lacking.	  Without	  drawing	  some	  kind	  of	  
connection	  between	  the	  already	  proven	  effects	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  and	  the	  resulting	  
political	  implications,	  the	  existing	  studies	  lack	  some	  degree	  of	  practical	  importance.	  
A	  desire	  to	  find	  those	  implications	  motivated	  me	  to	  pursue	  this	  study.	  
	  
Many	  individuals	  helped	  me	  complete	  this	  thesis.	  For	  so	  many	  reasons,	  this	  
would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  support	  of	  my	  parents,	  Joan	  and	  Ian,	  who	  
not	  only	  pushed	  me	  toward	  success	  throughout	  all	  my	  years	  of	  schooling,	  but	  also	  
encouraged	  me	  to	  attend	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  and	  ultimately	  to	  write	  a	  thesis	  on	  the	  
matter.	  I	  was	  initially	  skeptical	  of	  doing	  so,	  as	  I	  am	  of	  most	  things	  they	  encourage	  me	  
to	  do,	  but	  I	  am	  so	  grateful	  I	  ultimately	  took	  their	  advice.	  Completing	  this	  thesis	  has	  
become	  one	  of	  the	  defining	  experiences	  of	  my	  academic	  career,	  and	  I	  am	  thankful	  I	  
will	  always	  have	  this	  to	  look	  back	  on.	  I	  also	  have	  to	  thank	  my	  two	  older	  brothers,	  
Josh	  and	  James,	  who	  have	  taught	  me	  through	  example	  the	  value	  of	  hard	  work.	  I	  
would	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  Professor	  Mika	  LaVaque-­‐Manty,	  whose	  words	  of	  
encouragement	  over	  the	  past	  eight	  months	  did	  wonders	  to	  keep	  me	  calm	  
throughout	  this	  stressful	  process.	  Of	  course,	  I	  am	  also	  tremendously	  grateful	  for	  the	  
help	  provided	  by	  Professor	  Zvi	  Gitelman.	  He	  and	  I	  did	  not	  have	  a	  relationship	  prior	  
to	  the	  meeting	  in	  which	  I	  asked	  him	  to	  advise	  me	  on	  my	  work,	  and	  he	  welcomed	  me	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with	  open	  arms.	  He	  consistently	  sent	  me	  newspaper	  clippings	  and	  journal	  articles	  
that	  pertained	  to	  my	  work,	  he	  proofread	  my	  pages	  very	  closely,	  and	  he	  loved	  
pointing	  out	  holes	  in	  my	  methods.	  Lastly,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  friends	  who	  
occasionally	  convinced	  me	  to	  come	  out	  with	  them	  instead	  of	  locking	  myself	  in	  the	  
stacks,	  which	  helped	  keep	  me	  sane	  throughout	  this	  process.	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Introduction	  
	  
	   American	  Jewish	  voters	  have	  tended	  toward	  the	  left	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  
since	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  At	  the	  time,	  it	  was	  rather	  expected	  —	  liberal	  
candidates	  represented	  the	  views	  of	  the	  low	  and	  middle	  working	  classes,	  which	  
were	  composed	  in	  large	  part	  by	  European	  immigrants.	  In	  the	  decades	  since,	  the	  
Democratic	  Party	  has	  maintained	  a	  mostly	  reliable	  stronghold	  on	  the	  Jewish	  vote	  in	  
national	  presidential	  elections,	  even	  though	  the	  issues	  that	  American	  Jews	  find	  
salient	  have	  shifted	  considerably.	  In	  the	  late	  1940s,	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
Jewish	  state	  of	  Israel,	  American	  Jews	  embraced	  politicians	  who	  supported	  the	  
Zionist	  movement,	  a	  movement	  that	  at	  the	  time	  received	  bipartisan	  support.	  Thus,	  
Jewish	  support	  for	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  was	  still	  mostly	  unwavering.	  In	  the	  1960s	  
and	  1970s,	  American	  Jews	  continued	  to	  value	  pro-­‐Israel	  politicians,	  which	  was	  
partly	  illustrated	  by	  their	  discontent	  with	  progressive	  politicians	  who	  were	  hostile	  
toward	  Israel	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  of	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  Strip.	  
However,	  in	  recent	  decades,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  
American	  Jews’	  commitment	  to	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  is	  waning,	  particularly	  among	  
Jewish	  youths	  and	  young	  adults.	  Some	  scholars	  attribute	  this	  shift	  to	  a	  temporal	  
distancing	  between	  the	  birth	  of	  Israel	  and	  newer	  birth	  cohorts	  of	  American	  Jews.	  
That	  is,	  newer	  generations	  have	  less	  of	  a	  connection	  with	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  
Holocaust	  and	  the	  unbridled	  U.S.	  support	  of	  Israel	  that	  was	  customary	  following	  
Israel’s	  inception.	  This	  observation	  is	  widely	  considered	  a	  major	  inspiration	  for	  the	  
formation	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  Israel	  in	  1999	  —	  a	  program	  that	  sponsors	  free	  trips	  to	  
Israel	  for	  young	  Jewish	  adults	  around	  the	  world.	  The	  program	  was	  established	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through	  funding	  from	  Jewish	  philanthropists,	  the	  Israeli	  government	  and	  a	  number	  
of	  Jewish	  community	  organizations,	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  fostering	  a	  renewed	  
relationship	  between	  Israel	  and	  young	  Diaspora	  members	  from	  around	  the	  world.	  
	   Over	  a	  decade	  since	  its	  establishment,	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  has	  been	  a	  very	  positive	  experience	  for	  its	  participants.	  They	  have	  
reported	  that	  travelers	  find	  the	  program	  to	  be	  a	  life-­‐changing	  experience	  and	  that	  
they	  feel	  an	  increased	  connectedness	  to	  the	  state	  of	  Israel.	  Participants	  are	  also	  
more	  likely	  to	  marry	  a	  Jew	  later	  in	  life,	  and	  they	  express	  a	  greater	  interest	  in	  raising	  
future	  children	  in	  the	  Jewish	  faith.	  However,	  an	  important	  question	  has	  gone	  mostly	  
unanswered:	  do	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips	  to	  Israel	  affect	  the	  political	  attitudes	  and	  
behaviors	  of	  the	  participants?	  Scholars	  have	  examined	  why	  young	  American	  Jews	  do	  
not	  feel	  a	  strong	  connection	  with	  Israel,	  and	  they	  have	  marveled	  at	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright’s	  ability	  to	  repair	  that	  disconnect.	  But	  it	  would	  also	  be	  constructive	  to	  see	  
what	  the	  political	  ramifications	  of	  that	  reparation	  are.	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  is	  at	  least	  
partially	  politically	  funded	  (through	  the	  Israeli	  government),	  and	  there	  is	  much	  
speculation	  that	  the	  philanthropists	  who	  donate	  are,	  indeed,	  politically	  motivated.	  
That	  is,	  they	  may	  hope	  that	  participants	  will	  return	  home	  from	  the	  trip	  and	  become	  
more	  likely	  to	  vote	  for	  candidates	  who	  display	  unquestioned	  support	  for	  Israel,	  
especially	  in	  times	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  conflict.	  Moreover,	  they	  may	  want	  to	  ensure	  
that	  a	  future	  generation	  of	  leaders	  will	  look	  at	  their	  Biblical	  homeland	  as	  fondly	  as	  
their	  parents	  and	  grandparents	  —	  those	  whose	  lives	  have	  a	  much	  closer	  temporal	  
proximity	  to	  the	  birth	  of	  Israel.	  Though	  Israel	  is	  a	  particularly	  unique	  country	  in	  
regard	  to	  its	  religious	  significance	  and	  its	  tenuous	  relations	  with	  neighboring	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countries,	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  could	  also	  be	  applicable	  to	  other	  countries	  
that	  have	  launched	  programs	  similar	  to	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  (i.e.	  —	  Birthright	  Armenia	  
launched	  in	  2003	  and	  the	  Birthright	  Greece	  alliance	  in	  2007).	  
	   To	  find	  the	  political	  ramifications	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips,	  I	  looked	  to	  gain	  a	  
better	  understanding	  of	  how	  young	  Jews	  develop	  their	  political	  opinions.	  Because	  
the	  focus	  is	  on	  young	  adults,	  the	  participant	  pool	  consisted	  of	  a	  random	  sampling	  of	  
Jewish	  college	  students	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan.	  Their	  backgrounds	  vary	  —	  
some	  are	  actively	  involved	  with	  the	  University’s	  Hillel	  chapter	  or	  other	  Jewish	  
student	  organizations,	  some	  may	  have	  gone	  on	  a	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trip,	  and	  others	  
may	  not	  be	  very	  involved	  in	  Jewish	  social	  life	  at	  all.	  A	  similar	  study	  conducted	  by	  
Brandeis	  University	  professors	  that	  looked	  at	  the	  effects	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips	  
surveyed	  well	  over	  a	  thousand	  program	  applicants	  and	  participants,	  and	  it	  
controlled	  for	  certain	  pre-­‐trip	  variables	  using	  statistical	  regression.	  However,	  I	  lack	  
both	  the	  resources	  and	  time	  to	  conduct	  such	  an	  extensive	  survey,	  so	  my	  study	  
focuses	  on	  a	  much	  smaller	  sample	  group,	  and	  my	  survey	  questions	  are	  far	  more	  
open-­‐ended,	  allowing	  for	  engaging	  interviews	  and	  adequate	  qualitative	  analysis.	  
Before	  addressing	  political	  stances	  in	  the	  survey,	  I	  asked	  subjects	  questions	  about	  
their	  Jewish	  background	  and	  upbringing	  (questions	  about	  parental	  influence,	  
Hebrew	  school	  education,	  degree	  of	  observance,	  etc.)	  and	  their	  Jewish	  social	  life	  
(involvement	  in	  youth	  groups,	  student	  organizations,	  etc.).	  By	  gathering	  this	  
information,	  I	  can	  group	  subjects	  together	  based	  on	  their	  backgrounds	  and	  
perceived	  “Jewish-­‐ness,”	  and	  their	  responses	  regarding	  the	  Birthright	  trip	  and	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political	  opinions	  can	  be	  compared	  within	  the	  group,	  as	  well	  as	  across	  other	  groups.	  
This	  processed	  is	  explained	  further	  in	  the	  methods	  section.	  
	   I	  expect	  that	  because	  subjects	  feel	  more	  connected	  to	  Israel	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
Taglit-­‐Birthright	  participation,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  political	  attitude,	  
as	  trip	  participants	  should	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  embrace	  an	  ideology	  they	  feel	  is	  “pro-­‐
Israel.”	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  there	  will	  be	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  political	  
behavior	  of	  participants	  because	  a	  change	  in	  attitude	  will	  not	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  
affect	  the	  vote	  on	  Election	  Day.	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Review	  of	  Literature	  
	  
Before	  introducing	  research	  regarding	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  trips	  to	  Israel,	  a	  thorough	  literature	  review	  is	  needed	  to	  become	  
adequately	  acquainted	  with	  the	  history,	  circumstances	  and	  political	  tendencies	  of	  
this	  study’s	  subjects.	  First,	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  Americanization	  of	  Jews	  is	  
crucial	  to	  understanding	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  this	  study’s	  subject	  pool.	  One’s	  political	  
attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  are	  often	  a	  product	  of	  one’s	  history,	  and	  for	  reasons	  that	  
become	  apparent	  through	  the	  literature	  review,	  this	  tends	  to	  be	  especially	  true	  
among	  American	  Jews.	  Second,	  there	  has	  been	  ample	  literature	  that	  investigates	  
why	  American	  Jews	  have	  acted	  as	  they	  have	  within	  the	  political	  arena	  —	  at	  times,	  
their	  political	  behavior	  seems	  enigmatic,	  but	  explanations	  abound.	  Next,	  with	  those	  
foundations	  in	  place,	  I	  look	  at	  literature	  that	  takes	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  today’s	  situation	  
and	  why	  it	  appears	  that	  young	  American	  Jews	  have	  been	  distancing	  themselves	  
from	  Israel.	  And	  because	  that	  effect	  provided	  the	  impetus	  for	  the	  founding	  of	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright,	  I	  finish	  with	  a	  review	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright’s	  beginnings	  and	  some	  initial	  
studies	  that	  have	  evaluated	  the	  program’s	  effectiveness.	  	  
	  
The	  Americanization	  of	  Jews	  
The	  vast	  majority	  of	  Jews	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  the	  descendants	  of	  
European	  immigrants	  who	  arrived	  between	  1881	  and	  1914.	  However	  small	  a	  
minority	  Jews	  represent	  in	  today’s	  American	  population,	  they	  were	  a	  significant	  
slice	  of	  the	  new	  masses	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  —	  roughly	  10	  percent	  of	  the	  22	  
million	  immigrants	  who	  made	  it	  to	  U.S.	  soil	  during	  that	  period	  were	  Jews	  from	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Russia	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  (Chiswick	  39).	  Between	  the	  assassination	  of	  Russian	  
Tsar	  Alexander	  II	  in	  1881,	  which	  prompted	  pogroms	  that	  sparked	  mass	  emigration,	  
and	  the	  beginning	  of	  World	  War	  I	  in	  1914,	  about	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  Jewish	  population	  
throughout	  Eastern	  Europe	  fled	  to	  the	  United	  States	  (Dwork	  102).	  Rabbi	  Lee	  
Levinson	  also	  clarifies	  in	  his	  history	  of	  American	  Jews	  that	  although	  poverty	  was	  a	  
major	  impetus	  for	  Jewish	  emigration	  from	  Eastern	  Europe,	  it	  was	  the	  persecution	  of	  
Jewish	  communities	  that	  made	  that	  particular	  wave	  of	  emigration	  unique.	  He	  noted,	  
“The	  German	  Jews	  had	  come	  over	  to	  America	  with	  German	  Christians,	  but	  the	  
migration	  from	  Russia	  was	  strictly	  a	  Jewish	  migration;	  they	  came	  alone	  …	  because	  of	  
the	  special	  persecutions,”	  (269).	  	  
Jewish	  immigrants	  quickly	  carved	  out	  an	  occupational	  niche	  in	  lower-­‐class	  
industrial	  jobs	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  families.	  Ironically,	  the	  persecution	  of	  Jews	  who	  
had	  lived	  under	  the	  Russian	  May	  Laws	  in	  the	  1880s	  —	  Jews	  who	  were	  prohibited	  
from	  owning	  and	  renting	  land	  outside	  of	  major	  cities	  and	  forced	  to	  pack	  into	  urban	  
centers	  —	  played	  into	  their	  favor	  after	  voyaging	  across	  the	  Atlantic.	  The	  May	  Laws	  
had	  forced	  them	  to	  give	  up	  occupations	  of	  specialized	  craftsmen	  and	  artisans	  to	  take	  
growing	  urban	  industrial	  jobs.	  The	  period	  between	  1880	  and	  1900	  saw	  a	  great	  deal	  
of	  industrial	  development	  in	  urban	  centers	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  United	  
States,	  which	  gave	  many	  Jews	  the	  human	  capital	  needed	  for	  immediate	  employment	  
in	  major	  cities.	  According	  to	  Deborah	  Dwork,	  many	  European	  Jews	  took	  sewing	  
lessons	  in	  the	  months	  and	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  emigration	  specifically	  to	  prepare	  for	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jobs	  in	  the	  booming	  American	  garment	  industry	  (102-­‐103)1.	  Marc	  Raphael	  also	  
points	  out	  that	  it	  was	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  country’s	  ready-­‐made	  clothing	  
businesses	  exploded	  into	  an	  enormous	  U.S.	  industry	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  mass	  
immigration.	  By	  1915,	  over	  90	  percent	  of	  workers	  in	  the	  cloak	  and	  suit	  trades	  were	  
Jewish,	  and	  most	  were	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  (Raphael	  47).	  Over	  the	  same	  period,	  the	  
transfer	  of	  the	  synagogue	  and	  Jewish	  social	  structures	  from	  Russia	  to	  the	  United	  
States	  was	  relatively	  smooth.	  Jewish	  communities	  in	  major	  cities	  formed	  
landsmanshaftn,	  where	  pockets	  of	  Jews	  from	  the	  same	  areas	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  
would	  come	  together	  in	  a	  mutual-­‐aid	  society	  of	  sorts.	  Such	  an	  environment	  allowed	  
the	  traditional	  Jewish	  communal	  infrastructure	  —	  synagogues,	  kosher-­‐eating	  
traditions,	  collective	  charity	  —	  to	  thrive,	  at	  least	  temporarily,	  in	  American	  cities	  
(Chiswick	  43).	  
	   By	  and	  large,	  the	  subjects	  in	  the	  pool	  for	  this	  study	  hardly	  resemble	  the	  blue-­‐
collar	  working	  class	  profile	  of	  their	  Jewish	  ancestors	  who	  came	  to	  the	  United	  States	  
three	  or	  four	  generations	  ago.	  Today,	  Jews	  have	  a	  decisively	  American	  economic	  and	  
religious	  profile	  that	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  Jews	  elsewhere.	  A	  number	  of	  scholars	  
explain	  that	  this	  occurred	  through	  decades	  of	  assimilation,	  while	  others	  argue	  it	  was	  
a	  result	  of	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  immigrants	  themselves.	  I	  contend	  that	  it’s	  most	  likely	  a	  
combination.	  First-­‐generation	  Jewish	  immigrants,	  though	  forced	  to	  accept	  grimy	  
industrial	  jobs	  with	  poor	  work	  conditions,	  were	  determined	  to	  be	  a	  one-­‐generation	  
blue-­‐collar	  class.	  As	  Lucy	  Dawidowicz	  put	  it,	  the	  immigrants	  were	  “neither	  the	  sons	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Dwork	  does	  not	  present	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  but	  does	  point	  out	  that	  
even	  though	  Jews	  constituted	  just	  10.3	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  immigration	  population	  
from	  1900	  to	  1925,	  they	  accounted	  for	  a	  quarter	  of	  skilled	  industrial	  workers	  
throughout	  the	  United	  States.	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nor	  the	  fathers	  of	  workers,”	  (160).	  Just	  as	  they	  had	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Jewish	  
families	  placed	  especially	  high	  value	  on	  secular	  education	  for	  their	  children.	  By	  the	  
end	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  Jewish	  unions	  became	  the	  first	  American	  unions	  to	  develop	  
educational	  programs	  that	  taught	  members	  English,	  economics,	  and	  history.	  Jewish	  
enrollment	  in	  higher	  education	  grew	  rapidly,	  and	  with	  it,	  so	  did	  Jewish	  employment	  
in	  middle-­‐class	  professions	  (Dawidowicz	  161).	  By	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  poverty	  
among	  American	  Jews	  was	  rare,	  and	  the	  group’s	  stable	  presence	  in	  high-­‐level	  
professional	  and	  managerial	  occupations	  throughout	  the	  postwar	  period	  has	  been	  
remarkable.	  	  
	   But	  climbing	  the	  U.S.	  socioeconomic	  ladder	  necessitated	  sacrifices	  in	  Jewish	  
religiosity.	  Carmel	  Chiswick	  explains	  such	  a	  phenomenon	  using	  economics,	  defined	  
as	  the	  study	  of	  how	  people	  allocate	  their	  resources	  when	  such	  resources	  are	  limited.	  
The	  upwardly-­‐mobile	  children	  of	  Jewish	  immigrants	  were	  absorbed	  with	  issues	  of	  
economic	  assimilation,	  which	  required	  time	  and	  energy,	  of	  which	  they	  devoted	  less	  
and	  less	  to	  the	  Jewish	  community	  (Chiswick	  10).	  Religious	  leadership	  was	  forced	  to	  
accommodate	  in	  ways	  consistent	  with	  the	  new,	  relatively	  high	  cost	  of	  time	  and	  
energy	  —	  accommodation	  that	  led	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  the	  Conservative	  and	  
Reform	  Jewish	  movements	  that	  liberalized	  many	  Jewish	  practices	  (i.e.	  —	  keeping	  
kosher,	  weekly	  observance	  of	  Shabbat,	  etc.)	  
	  
Background	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  Vote	  
	   After	  the	  period	  of	  mass	  immigration	  from	  1880	  to	  1914,	  most	  Democratic	  
politicians	  fought	  for	  the	  working	  class	  and	  pushed	  to	  achieve	  egalitarian	  ideals,	  so	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it	  should	  come	  as	  little	  surprise	  that	  first-­‐generation	  Jews	  aligned	  decidedly	  left-­‐of-­‐
center	  in	  the	  political	  arena.	  Through	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s,	  the	  Jewish	  electorate,	  
along	  with	  its	  representation	  in	  Congress,	  took	  a	  dramatic	  shift	  to	  the	  left.	  There	  
were	  five	  Jewish	  representatives	  in	  the	  66th	  Congress	  (1919-­‐21),	  only	  one	  of	  whom	  
was	  a	  Democrat.	  By	  the	  75th	  Congress	  (1937-­‐39),	  there	  were	  10	  Jewish	  
representatives,	  and	  only	  one	  was	  a	  Republican	  (Feingold	  103).	  In	  the	  Depression	  
1930s,	  President	  Roosevelt’s	  New	  Deal	  politics	  was	  overwhelmingly	  popular	  among	  
Jews	  —	  a	  movement	  that	  Feingold	  contends	  was	  responsible	  for	  locking	  up	  the	  
Jewish	  vote	  for	  Democratic	  candidates	  in	  national	  elections	  for	  the	  next	  few	  decades.	  
The	  Yiddish-­‐speaking	  generation	  of	  Jews	  would	  say	  there	  are	  “dray	  velten:	  die	  velt,	  
yene	  velt,	  un	  Roosevelt,”	  which	  translates	  to	  “three	  worlds:	  this	  world,	  the	  next	  
world,	  and	  Roosevelt,”	  (Feingold	  107).	  But	  as	  the	  children	  and	  grandchildren	  of	  
first-­‐generation	  American	  Jews	  assimilated	  and	  found	  greater	  success	  in	  the	  
workplace,	  the	  Jewish	  vote	  became	  more	  difficult	  to	  explain.	  
Several	  studies	  have	  tried	  to	  find	  why	  American	  Jews	  have	  avoided	  shifting	  
toward	  conservatism,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  as	  they	  have	  shifted	  away	  from	  an	  
immigrant	  out-­‐group	  population.	  Lee	  Sigelman	  defines	  the	  term	  “pocketbook	  voting”	  
as,	  “the	  tendency	  to	  support	  or	  oppose	  the	  …	  candidate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  improving	  or	  
deteriorating	  personal	  economic	  circumstances,”	  (977).	  As	  American	  Jews	  have	  
improved	  their	  financial	  footing	  over	  time,	  their	  voting	  patterns	  have	  not	  reflected	  
that	  progression	  —	  so	  they	  have	  not	  been	  pocketbook	  voters.	  As	  Robert	  Lerner	  and	  
many	  others	  have	  observed,	  conservative	  support	  is	  highly	  correlated	  to	  a	  high	  
socioeconomic	  status,	  but	  even	  as	  Jews	  have	  reached	  that	  status,	  they	  remain	  a	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mostly	  liberal	  ethnic	  group	  (330).	  Stanley	  Feldman	  provides	  one	  explanation	  for	  
that	  phenomenon,	  though	  his	  analysis	  of	  pocketbook	  voting	  is	  more	  general	  and	  
pertains	  less	  to	  American	  Jews.	  He	  theorizes	  that	  the	  link	  between	  personal	  
economic	  well-­‐being	  and	  political	  affiliations	  is	  superficial	  and	  actually	  not	  as	  strong	  
as	  the	  public	  makes	  it	  out	  to	  be.	  He	  claims	  that	  the	  strong	  American	  belief	  in	  
economic	  individualism	  encourages	  people	  to	  accept	  responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  
financial	  circumstances,	  which	  causes	  most	  Americans	  —	  not	  just	  Jews	  —	  to	  actually	  
avoid	  pocketbook	  voting	  (447). Under	  such	  circumstances,	  it	  should	  be	  no	  surprise	  
that	  Jews	  persist	  in	  voting	  for	  Democratic	  candidates	  as	  they’ve	  secured	  financial	  
success.	  But,	  as	  Lawrence	  Fuchs	  pointed	  out,	  pocketbook	  voting	  is	  ultimately	  still	  
less	  of	  a	  factor	  among	  American	  Jews	  than	  in	  most	  other	  voting	  blocks,	  as	  American	  
Jews	  are	  the	  only	  ethno-­‐religious	  group	  whose	  voting	  patterns	  do	  not	  split	  across	  
Democratic-­‐Republican	  lines	  in	  any	  significant	  correlation	  with	  “occupational	  
prestige,	  amount	  of	  income,	  or	  education,”	  (387).	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  simply	  other	  
facets	  of	  Jewish	  life	  that	  have	  kept	  American	  Jews	  from	  defecting	  to	  conservatism.	  
Lerner	  et	  al.	  provide	  a	  good	  starting	  point,	  as	  they	  compared	  characteristics	  
of	  American	  Jewish	  and	  non-­‐Jewish	  elites,	  especially	  focusing	  on	  their	  economic	  and	  
political	  attitudes.	  They	  found	  that	  Jewish	  elites	  are	  more	  liberal	  than	  their	  non-­‐
Jewish	  counterparts,	  on	  multiple	  measures	  of	  liberalism,	  based	  on	  attitude	  and	  not	  
just	  voting	  patterns	  (335).	  They	  also	  found	  very	  few	  differences	  between	  the	  
attitudes	  of	  religiously	  reformed	  Jews	  and	  religiously	  conservative	  Jews,	  which	  
shows	  that	  the	  unified	  political	  liberalism	  among	  Jews	  in	  the	  U.S.	  is	  quite	  
comprehensive	  (not	  including	  the	  very	  small	  percentage	  of	  American	  Orthodox	  Jews,	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the	  attitudes	  of	  whom	  tend	  to	  be	  politically	  conservative)	  (338).	  Lerner	  concludes,	  
as	  others	  have,	  that	  this	  unity	  is	  a	  result	  of	  Jewish	  marginality	  of	  the	  past	  —	  this	  
refers	  to	  Jews	  being	  an	  immigrant	  out-­‐group	  throughout	  history.	  It	  is	  simply	  the	  
natural	  inclination	  of	  immigrant	  out-­‐groups	  to	  unify	  in	  such	  a	  manner.	  He	  adds	  that	  
traditional	  Jewish	  family	  values	  allow	  parental	  political	  ideologies	  to	  flow	  through	  
generations	  very	  easily,	  which	  helps	  to	  pass	  that	  unity	  on	  from	  grandparents	  to	  
parents	  to	  children.	  And	  this	  ties	  in	  well	  with	  a	  study	  conducted	  by	  Andrew	  Cherlin	  
and	  Carin	  Celebuski	  on	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  family.	  They	  found	  that	  
there	  are	  few	  differences	  between	  Jewish	  and	  non-­‐Jewish	  families	  in	  general,	  but	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  child	  rearing,	  Jewish	  parents	  tend	  to	  play	  a	  particularly	  large	  role	  
in	  their	  children’s	  social,	  economic	  and	  intellectual	  developments	  —	  a	  larger	  role	  
than	  parents	  of	  non-­‐Jewish	  families	  (908).	  So,	  it	  appears	  that	  ideologies	  of	  Jewish	  
parents	  could	  be	  passed	  down	  to	  children	  fairly	  easily	  and	  could	  be	  a	  major	  reason	  
that	  Jewish	  liberalism	  persists	  through	  socioeconomic	  progression.	  
	   Uzi	  Rebhun	  takes	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  explain	  the	  liberal	  unity	  among	  
American	  Jews,	  arguing	  that	  such	  political	  attitudes	  are	  better	  explained	  by	  the	  
common	  denominators	  in	  the	  Jewish	  religion.	  He	  insists	  that	  if	  political	  scientists	  are	  
to	  make	  judgments	  on	  the	  motivations	  of	  political	  orientation	  among	  American	  Jews,	  
they	  must	  understand	  the	  customs	  of	  Jewish	  families	  better	  (50).	  Rebhun	  concluded	  
that	  there	  are	  very	  close	  ties	  in	  the	  relationships	  between	  subgroups	  of	  Judaism	  —	  
more	  so	  than	  in	  other	  religions	  and	  ethnicities.	  And	  Jews	  are	  particularly	  linked	  in	  
their	  generally	  positive	  view	  of	  a	  Jewish	  state	  (to	  be	  discussed	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  
the	  next	  section)	  and	  on	  their	  observance	  of	  Yom	  Kippur	  —	  the	  Jewish	  Day	  of	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Atonement	  (55).	  Because	  of	  such	  links,	  the	  actions	  of	  American	  Jews	  tend	  to	  be	  
relatively	  cohesive,	  and	  although	  Rebhun	  did	  not	  comment	  much	  on	  the	  political	  
behavior	  of	  Jews,	  finding	  those	  common	  denominators	  provides	  a	  possible	  reason	  
why	  American	  Jews	  tend	  to	  act	  so	  collectively	  liberal	  in	  elections.	  Stephen	  M.	  Cohen	  
agrees	  with	  Rebhun	  when	  using	  holiday	  observance	  as	  a	  partial	  measure	  of	  
determining	  how	  Jewish	  some	  American	  Jews	  are.	  He	  contends	  that	  practicing	  the	  
traditions	  of	  holidays	  like	  Yom	  Kippur	  connects	  today’s	  Jews	  with	  their	  immediate	  
family,	  their	  family	  memories	  (parents),	  and	  their	  family	  aspirations	  (children)	  
(407).	  Perhaps	  such	  a	  religious	  connection	  is	  at	  least	  a	  partial	  reason	  why	  liberalism	  
persists	  from	  an	  immigrant	  population	  of	  Jews	  to	  an	  assimilated	  population	  of	  their	  
descendants.	  
Jonathan	  Sarna	  provides	  another	  link	  within	  the	  Jewish	  religion,	  claiming	  
that	  one	  of	  the	  major	  20th-­‐century	  reforms	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  synagogue	  was	  
its	  involvement	  in	  social	  action	  (224).	  Jewish	  leadership	  wanted	  to	  prove	  that	  
Judaism	  is	  no	  less	  concerned	  than	  Christianity	  about	  societal	  ills,	  and	  Tzedakah	  —	  
the	  Hebrew	  word	  for	  charity	  —	  became	  a	  major	  component	  of	  Jewish	  life.	  It	  is	  
possible	  that	  many	  Jews	  throughout	  the	  20th	  century	  merely	  believed	  liberal	  ideas	  of	  
social	  reform	  were	  consistent	  with	  their	  Jewish	  ideals	  and	  more	  important	  than	  
voting	  with	  their	  pocketbooks.	  
	  
Growing	  distance	  from	  Israel	  
	  
To	  this	  point,	  I	  have	  purposefully	  avoided	  discussion	  of	  Israel,	  which	  has	  had	  
a	  profound	  influence	  on	  American	  Jewish	  political	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  since	  the	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country’s	  inception	  in	  1948.	  I	  believe	  it	  was	  important	  to	  first	  establish	  the	  Jewish	  
peoples’	  persistent	  connection	  with	  liberalism	  and	  introduce	  research	  on	  the	  matter	  
before	  compounding	  that	  work	  with	  political	  support	  for	  Zionism.	  Indeed,	  the	  
American	  Jewish	  vote	  can	  be	  puzzling	  enough	  as	  it	  is,	  and	  Israel’s	  influence	  on	  it	  
comes	  with	  its	  own	  set	  of	  research.	  As	  Feingold	  pointed	  out,	  support	  for	  Israel	  after	  
1948	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  political	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  —	  it	  was	  an	  
important	  component	  of	  identity	  for	  Jews	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Few	  American	  
Zionists	  actually	  believed	  it	  was	  necessary	  for	  American	  Jews	  to	  go	  resettle	  in	  the	  
Biblical	  homeland	  and	  physically	  build	  a	  Jewish	  society.	  Rather,	  they	  believed,	  in	  the	  
wake	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  that	  Israel	  deserved	  political	  advocacy	  and	  representation	  
before	  the	  “American	  seat	  of	  power”	  (Feingold	  110).	  Such	  sentiments	  were	  by	  no	  
means	  fresh	  at	  that	  point	  —	  Louis	  Brandeis	  had	  spearheaded	  an	  American	  Jewish	  
Congress	  whose	  goal	  was	  to	  “secure	  Jewish	  development	  in	  Palestine”	  as	  early	  as	  
1915	  (Raphael	  114-­‐115).	  But	  by	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  such	  views	  had	  finally	  
permeated	  throughout	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community.	  
	   Initially,	  the	  birth	  of	  Israel	  did	  not	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  Jewish	  liberalism	  
in	  elections	  because	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  alike	  supported	  the	  Zionist	  
movement.	  It	  wasn’t	  until	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  a	  period	  that	  saw	  growing	  
hostility	  toward	  Israel	  from	  progressive	  politicians,	  that	  Jews	  had	  a	  particularly	  
tough	  choice	  to	  make.	  During	  those	  years,	  Jews	  turned	  out	  in	  large	  numbers	  to	  vote	  
for	  Republican	  Party	  candidates	  in	  Congress,	  and	  some	  Republicans	  believed	  the	  
Jewish	  vote	  would	  realign	  for	  good	  (Wald	  6).	  Feingold	  points	  out	  that	  supporting	  
Israel	  sometimes	  forced	  American	  Jews	  to	  abandon	  liberal	  universalist	  principles	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like	  the	  right	  of	  national	  self-­‐determination	  —	  especially	  for	  Palestinians	  —	  in	  favor	  
of	  Israel’s	  tenuous	  security,	  which	  at	  times	  required	  questionable	  preemptive	  use	  of	  
military	  power	  (110).	  However,	  that	  shift	  in	  attitude	  initially	  did	  not	  alter	  Jewish	  
voting	  patterns	  significantly	  in	  national	  elections,	  partly	  because	  presidential	  
candidates	  typically	  appeased	  Jewish	  voters	  by	  adopting	  pro-­‐Israel	  standpoints.	  
Jews	  did	  not	  shift	  significantly	  to	  the	  right	  in	  a	  presidential	  campaign	  until	  they	  
became	  dissatisfied	  with	  Jimmy	  Carter	  during	  his	  term	  in	  office.	  The	  Carter	  
administration	  openly	  supported	  a	  Palestinian	  homeland	  and	  condemned	  Israel’s	  
settlements	  in	  occupied	  territories.	  And	  by	  his	  1980	  campaign	  for	  re-­‐election	  
against	  a	  fiercely	  pro-­‐Israel	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  the	  Jewish	  voting	  block	  was	  ready	  to	  
send	  a	  message.	  Carter	  became	  the	  only	  Democratic	  candidate	  since	  1920	  to	  fail	  to	  
receive	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  Jewish	  vote,	  winning	  by	  a	  relatively	  narrow	  six-­‐point	  
margin	  (Maisel	  153).	  Ultimately,	  the	  shift	  to	  the	  right	  was	  temporary	  —	  in	  Ronald	  
Reagan’s	  decisive	  victory	  over	  Walter	  Mondale	  in	  the	  1984	  election,	  Mondale	  
controlled	  67	  percent	  of	  the	  Jewish	  vote.	  And	  from	  1992	  to	  2008,	  the	  Democratic	  
ticket	  in	  presidential	  elections	  never	  took	  less	  than	  76	  percent	  of	  the	  Jewish	  vote.	  
Jerold	  Auerbach	  argued	  that	  such	  a	  choice	  in	  the	  1980	  election	  shouldn’t	  have	  been	  
overly	  difficult	  to	  foresee.	  Israel	  was	  a	  “constant	  thorn	  in	  the	  side”	  of	  American	  
liberalism,	  and	  there	  was	  only	  so	  much	  time	  before	  the	  unbridled	  support	  for	  Israel	  
that	  blossomed	  after	  the	  Six-­‐Day	  War	  would	  last	  among	  liberal	  politicians	  (147).	  
Auerbach	  was	  onto	  something,	  but	  how	  today’s	  Jewish	  voters	  would	  have	  reacted	  to	  
Jimmy	  Carter’s	  opinions	  on	  Israel	  is	  much	  less	  clear.	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   More	  recent	  political	  science	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  over	  time,	  American	  
Jews	  —	  particularly	  the	  younger	  adults	  and	  their	  children	  —	  have	  begun	  to	  feel	  less	  
connected	  to	  the	  state	  of	  Israel,	  and	  they	  are	  thus	  less	  likely	  to	  “vote	  for	  Israel”	  than	  
for	  their	  liberal	  values.	  Cohen	  and	  Ari	  Kelman	  have	  put	  forth	  two	  separate	  
theoretical	  explanations	  —	  a	  life	  cycle	  effect	  and	  a	  birth	  cohort	  effect.	  The	  life	  cycle	  
effect	  suggests	  that	  Jews	  in	  different	  stages	  of	  life	  are	  simply	  more	  inclined	  to	  have	  a	  
different	  viewpoint	  than	  their	  parents	  until	  they	  grow	  up,	  become	  married,	  have	  
children,	  etc.	  At	  that	  point,	  they’d	  be	  expected	  to	  mature	  and	  eventually	  come	  to	  
embrace	  the	  values	  their	  parents	  so	  strongly	  supported.	  However,	  the	  study	  
ultimately	  favors	  the	  birth	  cohort	  effect,	  in	  which	  younger	  and	  younger	  birth	  
cohorts	  were	  born	  into	  different	  histories,	  with	  different	  surroundings	  (Baby	  
Boomers	  are	  to	  The	  Beatles	  as	  Generation	  X	  is	  to	  Nirvana,	  as	  the	  study	  puts	  it)	  (11).	  
Theoretically,	  the	  argument	  makes	  sense.	  The	  oldest	  living	  generation	  of	  American	  
Jews	  —	  those	  born	  before	  World	  War	  II	  —	  is	  very	  connected	  to	  and	  very	  supportive	  
of	  Israel	  because	  they	  remember,	  firsthand,	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  and	  the	  
state’s	  inception.	  The	  Baby	  Boomers	  also	  exhibit	  high	  levels	  of	  attachment	  to	  Israel	  
because	  they	  remember	  the	  Six-­‐Day	  War	  and	  ensuing	  U.S.	  support	  for	  Israel.	  
However,	  the	  attitude	  begins	  to	  shift	  with	  American	  Jews	  born	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  
when	  actions	  taken	  by	  Israel	  from	  that	  point	  forward	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  bit	  
more	  morally	  and	  politically	  complex	  than	  the	  actions	  taken	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  
country.	  Cohen	  and	  Kelman	  point	  to	  the	  First	  Lebanon	  War	  in	  1982,	  the	  first	  and	  
second	  Intifadas,	  and	  the	  Second	  Lebanon	  War	  as	  examples.	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   With	  data	  from	  the	  2007	  National	  Survey	  of	  American	  Jews,	  which	  Cohen	  and	  
Kelman	  themselves	  commissioned,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  quantify	  this	  birth	  cohort	  
effect	  to	  demonstrate	  attachment	  to	  Israel	  is	  not	  just	  waning	  for	  the	  youngest	  
American	  Jews,	  but	  rather	  it	  has	  declined	  from	  birth	  cohort	  to	  birth	  cohort,	  over	  
time:	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Attachment	  to	  Israel2	  
	  
The	  Birth	  of	  Birthright	  
	  
	   The	  Hebrew	  word	  Taglit	  translates	  literally	  to	  “discovery”	  in	  English,	  as	  the	  
program	  is	  designed	  to	  allow	  its	  participants	  to	  discover	  the	  Jewish	  homeland	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  2007	  National	  Survey	  of	  American	  Jews	  elicited	  responses	  from	  over	  1,800	  
Jews	  either	  by	  email	  or	  snail	  mail,	  and	  Orthodox	  Jews	  were	  kept	  out	  of	  the	  sample	  
pool.	  It	  covered	  a	  very	  wide	  range	  of	  viewpoints	  and	  attitudes	  regarding	  Israel.	  Here,	  
Cohen	  and	  Kelman	  draw	  from	  question	  10:	  “Below	  are	  the	  different	  ways	  people	  
may	  feel	  about	  Israel	  (proud,	  excited,	  ambivalent,	  ashamed).	  In	  each	  case,	  how	  often	  






























	   21	  
previously	  felt	  they	  had	  little-­‐to-­‐no	  connection	  with.	  In	  deciding	  who	  is	  eligible	  to	  
travel	  with	  Taglit-­‐Birthright,	  the	  program	  has	  chosen	  criteria	  that	  seem	  to	  target	  
precisely	  those	  people	  who	  may	  feel	  such	  a	  disconnect	  —	  people	  aged	  18	  to	  26	  with	  
at	  least	  one	  Jewish	  grandparent	  and	  who	  do	  not	  practice	  a	  religion	  other	  than	  
Judaism.	  Applicants	  who	  have	  previously	  travelled	  to	  Israel	  with	  another	  organized	  
group	  (i.e.	  —	  youth	  groups,	  high	  school	  trips,	  etc.)	  are	  disqualified	  from	  
consideration.	  Over	  the	  program’s	  13	  years	  of	  existence,	  it	  has	  provided	  free	  trips	  
for	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  that	  cohort.	  According	  to	  Taglit-­‐Birthright’s	  website,	  
there	  have	  been	  over	  300,000	  participants	  from	  59	  countries	  (the	  majority	  is	  from	  
the	  United	  States),	  dating	  back	  to	  2000.	  The	  number	  of	  participants	  travelling	  
annually	  has	  been	  growing	  rapidly	  lately,	  and	  the	  program’s	  new	  goal	  is	  to	  send	  
51,000	  Jews	  worldwide	  to	  Israel	  in	  2013.	  Such	  an	  expansion	  has	  been	  made	  possible	  
by	  a	  growth	  in	  the	  program’s	  three	  branches	  of	  funding:	  wealthy	  philanthropists,	  
Jewish	  community	  organizations,	  and	  the	  Israeli	  government.	  Since	  the	  program’s	  
inception,	  the	  philanthropists	  have	  generally	  been	  the	  most	  financially	  supportive	  of	  
the	  program.	  Some	  big-­‐name	  donors	  include	  hedge-­‐fund	  titan	  Michael	  Steinhardt	  
and	  Seagram	  Company’s	  Charles	  Bronfman	  —	  who	  founded	  the	  organization	  
together	  —	  as	  well	  as	  Las	  Vegas	  Sands	  CEO	  Sheldon	  Adelson,	  whose	  family	  
foundation	  doled	  out	  a	  $37	  million	  contribution	  in	  2008	  when	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  was	  
strapped	  for	  cash	  (Shemer).	  But	  the	  other	  branches	  have	  been	  especially	  supportive	  
more	  recently.	  The	  Israeli	  government,	  upon	  insistence	  from	  Prime	  Minister	  
Benjamin	  Netanyahu,	  pledged	  $100	  million	  over	  three	  years,	  from	  2011	  to	  2013.	  In	  
response,	  North	  American	  Jewish	  federations	  and	  private	  philanthropists	  together	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decided	  to	  match	  the	  Israeli	  contribution	  with	  $240	  million	  over	  the	  same	  span	  
(Shemer).	  
	   More	  than	  anything	  else,	  Steinhardt	  and	  Bronfman	  say	  they	  founded	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  to	  halt,	  or	  at	  least	  slow	  down,	  the	  “crisis	  of	  continuity.”	  Today’s	  young	  
Jews	  feel	  less	  and	  less	  of	  a	  need	  to	  marry	  in-­‐faith	  and/or	  raise	  their	  children	  Jewish,	  
and	  many	  feel	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  an	  eventual	  Jewish	  extinction.	  The	  concern	  is	  most	  
certainly	  justified	  —	  the	  intermarriage	  rate	  among	  Jews	  was	  merely	  nine	  percent	  for	  
those	  married	  prior	  to	  1965,	  and	  the	  rate	  between	  1985	  and	  1990	  was	  already	  up	  to	  
52	  percent	  (though	  it	  was	  later	  adjusted	  down	  to	  47	  percent).	  Of	  intermarriages,	  
only	  a	  bit	  more	  than	  a	  quarter	  are	  reported	  to	  raise	  children	  Jewish,	  while	  the	  rest	  
either	  raise	  children	  without	  a	  faith	  or	  in	  a	  non-­‐Jewish	  faith	  (Ritterband	  393).	  In	  the	  
1970s,	  as	  intermarriage	  started	  to	  become	  a	  growing	  concern,	  many	  Jewish	  
communities	  altered	  their	  stance	  from	  outrage	  to	  outreach.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  slow	  
intermarriage	  rates,	  which	  appeared	  to	  be	  an	  unstoppable	  force,	  they	  refocused	  
their	  attention	  to	  helping	  intermarried	  couples	  raise	  their	  children	  Jewish	  (Mayer	  
420).	  But	  it	  wasn’t	  enough,	  and	  intermarriage	  rates	  continued	  to	  rise.	  In	  1999,	  
Taglit-­‐Birthright	  was	  a	  new	  method	  of	  outreach	  praised	  as	  a	  method	  to	  target	  Jews,	  
in	  most	  cases,	  before	  they	  are	  married.	  Issues	  of	  intermarriage	  are	  not	  explicitly	  
discussed	  on	  the	  trip	  —	  rather,	  the	  belief	  of	  the	  founders	  was	  that	  an	  enriching	  
experience	  in	  the	  Jewish	  homeland	  would	  inspire	  the	  young	  Diasporas	  to	  reconsider	  
their	  Biblical	  roots	  and	  take	  them	  more	  seriously	  (Powers	  9).	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The	  Birthright	  Effect	  
	  
	   Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips	  provide	  an	  intense	  10-­‐day	  experience	  of	  practically	  
non-­‐stop	  travel,	  and	  each	  component	  of	  the	  trip	  is	  framed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  intended	  
to	  be	  meaningful	  for	  the	  participants.	  On	  the	  first	  day,	  trip	  leaders	  inform	  
participants	  that	  the	  trip	  will	  not	  be	  a	  vacation	  —rather,	  it	  will	  be	  an	  educational	  
experience	  that	  provides	  “a	  connection	  between	  Israel,	  the	  Holocaust,	  contemporary	  
Jewish	  life,	  and	  your	  personal	  Jewish	  identity,”	  (Ten	  Days	  39).	  The	  climbing	  of	  
Mount	  Masada	  is	  a	  great	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  framing.	  After	  taking	  time	  to	  relax	  
on	  the	  hilltop	  and	  take	  pictures	  with	  the	  Dead	  Sea	  and	  sunrise	  in	  the	  background,	  
the	  designated	  trip	  leader	  takes	  over	  to	  explain	  the	  historical	  significance	  of	  Masada.	  
After	  the	  Romans	  destroyed	  the	  Temple	  of	  Jerusalem	  in	  70	  C.E.,	  Masada	  represented	  
the	  final	  location	  of	  Jewish	  independence	  before	  the	  Romans	  took	  full	  control.	  In	  
April	  of	  73	  C.E.,	  General	  Flavius	  Silva	  surrounded	  Masada	  and	  prepared	  to	  conquer	  
the	  final	  insurgents.	  But	  instead	  of	  surrendering,	  most	  of	  the	  remaining	  men	  jumped	  
off	  of	  the	  cliff	  to	  commit	  suicide	  and	  avoid	  subjecting	  themselves	  to	  inevitable	  
slavery.	  Today,	  the	  Hebrew	  saying,	  shenit	  Masada	  lo	  tipol	  (Masada	  will	  never	  fall	  
again),	  has	  come	  to	  mean	  that	  Jews	  will	  always	  fight	  back	  to	  defeat	  an	  enemy	  and	  
thus	  will	  never	  face	  such	  grave	  circumstances	  again.	  Of	  course,	  different	  trip	  leaders	  
are	  flexible	  to	  apply	  their	  own	  brand	  of	  the	  story	  of	  Masada	  and	  its	  historical	  
significance,	  but	  either	  consciously	  or	  subconsciously,	  participants	  acknowledge	  
that	  Masada	  is	  a	  meaningful	  symbol	  of	  Jewish	  continuity	  under	  the	  threat	  of	  
invading	  foreign	  forces	  (Ten	  Days	  41).	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   Another	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips	  is	  the	  mifgash,	  which	  is	  
Hebrew	  for	  “encounter”	  or	  “cultural	  exchange.”	  Midway	  through	  the	  trip,	  several	  
active	  Israeli	  Defense	  Force	  soldiers	  join	  the	  group	  and	  travel	  with	  the	  participants	  
for	  four	  or	  five	  days.	  This	  aspect	  of	  the	  trip	  was	  incorporated	  by	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  in	  
2002,	  when	  the	  founders	  were	  concerned	  that	  although	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  trip	  
were	  profoundly	  moving,	  the	  participants	  were	  still	  looking	  in	  from	  an	  outsider’s	  
perspective	  (Ten	  Days	  73).	  During	  the	  mifgash,	  Diasporas	  learn	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  
their	  Israeli	  contemporaries,	  particularly	  the	  differences	  in	  their	  Jewish	  culture,	  but	  
perhaps	  more	  importantly	  the	  similarities.	  Many	  participants	  report	  being	  surprised	  
that	  the	  IDF	  soldiers	  do	  not	  resemble	  the	  religious	  zealots	  they	  had	  imagined	  prior	  
to	  the	  trip,	  and	  they	  are	  often	  surprised	  that	  they	  share	  many	  of	  the	  same	  interests.	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  moving	  experiences	  for	  participants	  is	  when	  they	  visit	  Mount	  Herzl	  
—	  Israel’s	  national	  military	  cemetery	  —	  along	  with	  the	  IDF	  soldiers.	  More	  often	  
than	  not,	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  soldiers	  knew	  a	  buried	  serviceman	  or	  servicewoman	  in	  
that	  cemetery	  very	  well,	  and	  he/she	  will	  share	  memories	  of	  the	  fallen	  with	  the	  
group.	  Many	  participants	  report	  feeling	  overwhelmed	  or	  incredibly	  humbled	  by	  the	  
experience,	  as	  it	  is	  generally	  difficult	  visiting	  the	  graves	  of	  18,	  19	  and	  20-­‐year-­‐olds,	  
especially	  when	  you	  make	  that	  visit	  with	  soldiers	  who	  are	  committed	  to	  making	  the	  
same	  sacrifice	  for	  their	  country	  (Ten	  Days	  85).	  	  	  
	   If	  success	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips	  is	  measured	  in	  intermarriage	  rates	  —	  the	  
issue	  that	  inspired	  the	  organization,	  according	  to	  the	  founders	  —	  they	  have	  been	  
quite	  effective.	  A	  non-­‐Orthodox	  participant	  with	  intermarried	  parents	  is	  700-­‐
percent	  more	  likely	  than	  a	  non-­‐Orthodox	  nonparticipant	  with	  intermarried	  parents	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to	  marry	  a	  Jew	  later	  in	  life.	  And	  the	  corresponding	  figure	  for	  those	  with	  inmarried	  
parents	  is	  128	  percent	  (Intermarriage	  161-­‐62).	  But	  considering	  that	  these	  trips	  
create	  such	  an	  intimate	  bond	  between	  participants	  and	  Israel,	  there	  are	  many	  other	  
effects	  we	  can	  study.	  Through	  a	  survey	  study	  administered	  in	  2009	  to	  trip	  
applicants	  who	  traveled	  between	  2001	  and	  2004,	  Saxe	  et	  al.	  found	  that	  participants	  
are	  23	  percent	  more	  likely	  than	  nonparticipants	  to	  feel	  “very	  much	  connected	  to	  
Israel,”	  24	  percent	  more	  likely	  to	  strongly	  agree	  with	  the	  statement,	  “I	  have	  a	  strong	  
sense	  of	  connection	  with	  the	  Jewish	  people,”	  and	  30	  percent	  more	  likely	  to	  view	  
raising	  children	  Jewish	  as	  “very	  important.”	  3	  Moreover,	  when	  participants	  are	  
asked	  to	  think	  about	  the	  trip	  and	  its	  effects	  in	  retrospect,	  a	  vast	  majority	  says	  that	  
they	  feel	  much	  closer	  to	  Israel	  than	  prior	  to	  the	  trip	  (Generation	  Birthright	  9):	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Saxe,	  et	  al	  considered	  these	  values	  predicted	  probabilities.	  They	  produced	  these	  
results	  through	  a	  regression	  analysis	  of	  survey	  data	  that	  assessed	  whether	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  certain	  outcomes	  when	  taking	  pre-­‐existing	  conditions	  
into	  account.	  These	  regression	  models	  attempted	  to	  control	  for	  differences	  in	  
variables	  between	  participants	  and	  nonparticipants	  (i.e.	  —	  gender,	  age,	  having	  
attended	  Jewish	  day	  school	  for	  eight	  years	  or	  more,	  attendance	  of	  Jewish	  
supplemental	  school,	  scale	  of	  ritual	  practice,	  having	  intermarried	  parents,	  etc.)	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Figure	  2:	  Participants'	  Perceptions	  of	  How	  Much	  the	  Trip	  Made	  Them	  Feel	  Closer	  to	  Israel4	  
	   	  
	   The	  evidence	  presented	  by	  Saxe	  is	  compelling,	  and	  he	  thoroughly	  accounted	  for	  
a	  wide	  range	  of	  the	  program’s	  effects	  on	  the	  participants,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  not	  
mentioned	  here	  for	  lack	  of	  relevance	  to	  the	  proposed	  question.	  But	  he	  neglected	  to	  
answer	  two	  very	  important	  questions	  in	  his	  research	  —	  though	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  
trips	  may	  have	  succeeded,	  to	  date,	  in	  addressing	  the	  founders’	  main	  concerns	  
regarding	  Judaism	  (i.e.	  —	  outmarriage)	  and	  inspiring	  a	  connection	  between	  
Diasporas	  and	  Israel,	  do	  the	  trips	  also	  affect	  the	  political	  attitudes	  and	  political	  
behaviors	  of	  the	  same	  cohort?	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  will	  detail	  why	  such	  
questions	  are	  important,	  and	  how	  I	  will	  answer	  them.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	  chart	  from	  Saxe	  et	  al,	  unlike	  the	  predicted	  probabilities,	  was	  merely	  based	  on	  
estimated	  proportions	  —	  simple	  weighted	  tabulations	  of	  the	  data.	  The	  regression	  








Not	  at	  all	  





Leonard	  Saxe	  and	  Barry	  Chazan	  claim	  that	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  is	  the	  largest	  
educational	  experiment	  ever	  attempted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Jewish	  
community,	  and	  they	  measured	  the	  social	  effects	  of	  the	  experiment	  using	  
outmarriage	  rates	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  connection	  with	  Israel	  (Ten	  Days	  4).	  I	  don’t	  doubt	  
the	  assertion	  nor	  the	  measurements,	  but	  I	  believe	  they	  overlooked	  the	  possibility	  of	  
profound	  political	  consequences.	  That	  is,	  I	  believe	  they	  left	  out	  a	  major	  dependent	  
variable,	  and	  with	  it,	  a	  good	  portion	  of	  the	  discussion	  we	  should	  be	  having.	  The	  
relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  is	  mutually	  symbiotic	  —	  for	  the	  
United	  States,	  Israel	  represents	  a	  beacon	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  a	  
place	  where	  Jews	  can	  always	  have	  a	  home,	  and	  in	  return,	  Israel	  gets	  military	  and	  
diplomatic	  support	  from	  the	  United	  Staes	  that	  it	  very	  much	  relies	  on.	  In	  the	  United	  
Nations,	  for	  example,	  Israel’s	  interests	  have	  been	  defended	  by	  a	  U.S.	  veto	  in	  the	  
Security	  Council	  more	  than	  forty	  times	  between	  1972	  and	  2011,	  oftentimes	  when	  it	  
was	  the	  only	  veto	  (Eizenstat	  267).	  But	  what	  is	  to	  come	  of	  that	  relationship	  when	  
today’s	  young	  Americans,	  many	  of	  whom	  don’t	  identify	  with	  —	  and	  some	  of	  whom	  
denounce	  —	  the	  Israeli	  cause,	  become	  tomorrow’s	  leaders?	  Regardless	  of	  what	  
Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips	  do	  for	  outmarriage	  rates	  and	  Judaism,	  the	  political	  effects	  are	  
perhaps	  just	  as	  powerful.	  Each	  year,	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  new	  program	  alumni	  go	  
back	  to	  their	  synagogues	  and	  communities	  more	  inspired	  to	  fight	  for	  Israel.	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  CEO	  Gidi	  Mark	  proclaims	  that	  former	  travelers	  “go	  back	  to	  anti-­‐Zionists	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on	  their	  campuses	  and	  say	  to	  them,	  ‘Don’t	  tell	  me	  what	  you	  saw	  on	  CNN	  —	  I	  was	  
there’	  ”	  (Feldman,	  K.	  2).	  
Mark	  also	  claims	  that	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  is	  a	  totally	  apolitical	  organization.	  But	  
frankly,	  given	  the	  above	  quote,	  that	  seems	  utterly	  contradictory.	  A	  new	  generation	  
of	  American	  Jews	  reenergized	  to	  stand	  up	  for	  Israel	  and	  fight	  against	  anti-­‐Zionists	  is	  
precisely	  a	  political	  effect,	  regardless	  of	  any	  apolitical	  ambitions	  the	  program	  may	  
also	  espouse.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  the	  organization’s	  funding	  
does	  come	  from	  politically	  charged	  sources.	  Many	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright’s	  initial	  
funders	  —including	  Steinhardt	  and	  Bronfman	  —	  were	  trustees	  of	  the	  Washington	  
Institute	  for	  Near	  East	  Policy,	  a	  mostly	  conservative	  pro-­‐Israel	  think	  tank	  inspired	  
by	  AIPAC,	  which	  is	  a	  very	  powerful	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby.	  AIPAC	  actually	  sponsors	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  trips	  every	  year,	  even	  though	  J-­‐Street	  —	  a	  more	  liberal	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  
that	  advocates	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  —	  was	  turned	  down	  for	  a	  sponsorship	  in	  
February	  2011	  on	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  a	  political	  organization	  (Feldman,	  K.	  2).	  Of	  
course,	  the	  Israeli	  government	  itself	  has	  made	  considerable	  investments	  in	  the	  
program,	  especially	  in	  recent	  years	  as	  reports	  have	  more	  conclusively	  determined	  
the	  positive	  effects	  it’s	  had	  on	  participants.	  Perhaps	  Israel	  sees	  such	  donations	  as	  
long-­‐term	  political	  investments,	  as	  the	  trips	  may	  groom	  a	  base	  of	  future	  American	  
support	  (though	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  produces	  immediate	  
economic	  incentives	  for	  Israel	  as	  well,	  like	  Americans	  pumping	  millions	  into	  the	  
tourism	  and	  restaurant	  industries)	  (Shemer).	  
Taglit-­‐Birthright	  is	  a	  very	  young	  organization,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  potential	  
political	  effects	  may	  be	  long	  term,	  but	  it’s	  worth	  knowing	  if	  we	  can	  see	  any	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immediate	  impacts	  to	  date.	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  surveyed	  college-­‐age	  Jews	  to	  determine	  the	  
trips’	  effects	  on	  political	  attitude	  —	  whether	  the	  trip	  made	  a	  participant	  more	  likely	  
to	  support	  Israel	  politically	  —	  and	  on	  political	  behavior	  —	  whether	  such	  support	  




	   My	  analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips	  is	  based	  on	  an	  extensive	  
survey	  distributed	  to	  Jewish	  undergraduate	  students	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan.	  
The	  students	  were	  reached	  via	  email	  through	  the	  University	  Hillel	  chapter,	  meaning	  
each	  of	  the	  subjects	  have	  the	  common	  denominator	  of	  being	  registered	  on	  Hillel’s	  
mailing	  list.	  Such	  a	  subject	  pool	  does	  provide	  a	  random	  sampling	  of	  University	  Jews	  
(at	  least	  at	  Michigan),	  as	  the	  students	  on	  the	  Hillel	  mailing	  list	  range	  from	  very	  
involved	  in	  Hillel	  activities	  to	  not	  involved	  at	  all,	  and	  from	  a	  practice	  of	  Orthodox	  
Judaism	  to	  Reform	  Judaism,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  students	  who	  don’t	  observe	  the	  faith	  at	  
all	  but	  still	  identify	  themselves	  as	  Jews.	  To	  help	  avoid	  a	  selection	  bias	  in	  which	  the	  
people	  actually	  clicking	  on	  the	  survey	  link	  would	  be	  characteristically	  more	  involved	  
in	  Hillel	  or	  more	  Jewish	  than	  those	  not	  clicking	  the	  link,	  I	  did	  provide	  the	  incentive	  
of	  a	  $50	  gift	  card	  raffle	  upon	  full	  completion	  of	  the	  survey.	  The	  survey	  consists	  of	  six	  
distinct	  sections:	  identification	  questions,	  Jewish	  upbringing,	  Jewish	  social	  life,	  
experience	  in	  Israel	  (if	  applicable),	  parental	  political	  attitudes/behaviors,	  and	  
personal	  political	  attitudes/behaviors.	  
	   Though	  the	  survey	  is	  mostly	  qualitative,	  the	  initial	  identification	  questions	  
allow	  me	  to	  set	  up	  a	  coding	  system	  to	  place	  students	  into	  one	  of	  four	  categories:	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   Separating	  the	  subjects	  into	  these	  four	  groups	  is	  essential	  because	  my	  subject	  
pool	  is	  not	  nearly	  extensive	  enough	  to	  provide	  a	  meaningful	  statistical	  regression	  
with	  quantitative	  analysis	  that	  accounts	  for	  pre-­‐trip	  variables.	  Researchers	  like	  
Leonard	  Saxe	  have	  a	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  organization	  
and	  thus	  have	  had	  access	  to	  contact	  information	  for	  thousands	  of	  participants	  
nationwide.	  Unfortunately,	  I	  am	  not	  afforded	  the	  same	  luxury.	  So,	  by	  breaking	  up	  
subjects	  based	  on	  their	  pre-­‐trip	  characteristics,	  I	  can	  at	  least	  effectively	  compare	  
survey	  results	  between	  like-­‐minded	  individuals	  in	  my	  smaller	  sample	  pool,	  which	  
would	  then	  allow	  for	  a	  meaningful	  qualitative	  analysis.	  For	  example,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  
particularly	  prudent	  for	  me	  to	  compare	  the	  political	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  of	  
Student	  A,	  a	  non-­‐Bar	  Mitzvah	  and	  non-­‐High	  Holy	  Day	  observer	  who	  has	  not	  been	  to	  
Israel,	  with	  Student	  B,	  a	  Bar	  Mitzvah	  and	  frequent	  Shabbat	  observer	  who	  has	  been	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regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  student	  B	  had	  actually	  gone	  to	  Israel.	  It	  would	  be	  much	  
more	  helpful	  if	  I	  could	  actually	  compare	  like-­‐minded	  Jews.	  What	  are	  the	  differences	  
in	  opinion	  between	  the	  less	  Jewish	  students	  who	  have	  not	  been	  to	  Israel	  and	  the	  less	  
Jewish	  students	  who	  have	  been	  to	  Israel?	  And	  what	  is	  the	  same	  difference	  for	  the	  
more	  Jewish	  students?	  Below	  are	  the	  identification	  questions,	  along	  with	  each	  
answer’s	  point	  value	  in	  parentheses:	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   Each	  of	  the	  above	  questions	  is	  important	  to	  ask	  in	  establishing	  the	  subjects’	  
level	  of	  “Jewishness,”	  and	  I	  drew	  heavily	  from	  Uzi	  Rebhun’s	  work	  in	  picking	  the	  
criteria.	  Issues	  of	  Jewish	  education	  (which	  is	  typically	  required	  for	  Bar/Bat	  Mitzvahs	  
and	  confirmation),	  denomination,	  observance,	  parental	  involvement	  and	  community	  
Have	  you	  had	  a	  Bar/Bat	  Mitzvah?	  
• No	  (0)	  
• Yes	  (1)	  
Have	  you	  been	  conrirmed?	  
• No	  (0)	  
• Yes	  (1)	  





• Just	  Jewish	  (0)	  
• Other	  (-­‐)	  





Do	  you	  observe	  the	  High	  Holy	  Days	  and/or	  Passover?	  
• Both	  (1)	  
• One	  or	  neither	  (0)	  
How	  involved	  have	  your	  parents	  been	  in	  your	  Jewish	  upbringing?	  
• Not	  involved	  (0)	  
• Somewhat	  involved	  (1)	  
• Heavily	  involved	  (2)	  
Are	  you	  involved	  with	  Jewish	  life	  on	  campus?	  
• Not	  involved	  (0)	  
• Somewhat	  involved	  (1)	  
• Heavily	  involved	  (2)	  
Have	  you	  been	  on	  a	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trip	  to	  Israel	  (or	  another	  organized	  peer	  trip)?	  
• No	  
• Yes	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involvement	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  campus)	  are	  all	  important	  metrics.	  The	  cutoff	  in	  order	  
for	  subjects	  to	  qualify	  as	  “more	  Jewish”	  was	  6.5	  points.	  Then,	  they	  were	  split	  up	  by	  
whether	  or	  not	  they	  had	  been	  on	  an	  organized	  peer	  trip	  to	  Israel.	  Although	  BBYO-­‐
sponsored	  trips,	  Ramah	  seminars	  and	  others	  may	  vary	  a	  bit	  in	  curriculum	  and	  
itinerary	  from	  Taglit-­‐Birthright,	  they	  are	  still	  likely	  to	  have	  similar	  affects	  on	  the	  
mindset	  of	  young	  American	  Jews	  (Shay	  90).	  Ultimately,	  72	  subjects	  answered	  the	  
survey,	  and	  they	  broke	  into	  the	  four	  groups	  as	  follows:	  
	  
	   The	  meat	  of	  the	  survey	  is	  the	  final	  page,	  on	  which	  I	  ask	  students	  about	  their	  
personal	  political	  opinions	  about	  Israel,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  behaviors	  (i.e.	  —	  what	  they	  
consider	  at	  the	  polls).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  there	  are	  different	  ways	  to	  
approach	  support	  or	  neglect	  for	  the	  state	  of	  Israel.	  I	  don’t	  merely	  ask	  if	  Israel	  is	  a	  
voting	  issue,	  as	  that	  would	  be	  making	  a	  complex	  concept	  too	  black	  and	  white.	  The	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   The	  two	  most	  important	  questions	  in	  the	  above	  group	  are	  the	  fourth	  and	  fifth	  
—	  whether	  Israel	  makes	  the	  subject	  more	  liberal	  or	  conservative	  overall,	  and	  
whether	  Israel	  pushes	  the	  subject’s	  vote	  in	  a	  particular	  direction.	  Respectively,	  these	  
are	  measures	  of	  political	  attitude	  and	  political	  behavior.	  Additionally,	  the	  other	  
questions	  in	  this	  group	  and	  on	  the	  previous	  survey	  pages,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  open-­‐
ended	  nature,	  clue	  me	  in	  on	  how	  the	  subjects	  develop	  their	  political	  opinions	  and	  
behaviors.	  Different	  subjects	  may	  vary	  greatly	  in	  aspects	  of	  their	  Jewish	  upbringing,	  
their	  Jewish	  practices,	  and	  their	  experience	  in	  Israel,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  those	  
characteristics	  affected	  their	  politics.	  Throughout	  the	  survey,	  I	  give	  subjects	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  explain	  their	  circumstances.	  	  
	  
1.	  Does	  Judaism	  play	  a	  role	  in	  your	  political	  views.	  If	  so,	  how?	  
2.	  How	  supportive	  are	  you	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  in	  times	  of	  conrlict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East?	  
3.	  Do	  you	  consider	  U.S.	  support	  of	  Israel	  to	  be	  a	  minor	  or	  major	  political	  issue?	  
4.	  Do	  your	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  your	  overall	  political	  stance	  (i.e.	  —	  are	  you	  more	  
conservative/liberal	  overall	  because	  of	  your	  views	  on	  Israel?)	  Please	  explain.	  
5.	  Do	  your	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  your	  vote	  in	  national	  elections?	  If	  so,	  how?	  
6.	  Why	  is	  Israel	  important/unimportant	  to	  you	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  voting	  in	  national	  
elections?	  
7.	  If	  you	  have	  been	  to	  Israel,	  have	  you	  altered	  your	  political	  views	  based	  on	  information	  
you	  learned	  on	  the	  trip,	  or	  based	  on	  a	  personal	  reaction	  from	  the	  trip?	  If	  so,	  how?	  
8.	  Are	  you	  more	  or	  less	  inclined	  to	  vote	  for	  a	  particular	  party	  in	  national	  elections	  
because	  of	  your	  views	  on	  Israel	  since	  the	  trip?	  Why?	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Hypothesis	  
	   I	  believe	  that	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips,	  along	  with	  other	  organized	  peer	  trips	  to	  
Israel,	  will	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  political	  attitudes,	  but	  not	  on	  political	  
behavior.	  There	  has	  been	  sufficient	  evidence,	  as	  presented	  in	  the	  review	  of	  literature,	  
that	  shows	  that	  the	  trips	  spark	  a	  deeply	  emotional	  reaction	  in	  participants,	  and	  I	  
think	  that	  it	  may	  very	  well	  lead	  subjects	  to	  lean	  a	  particular	  direction	  in	  the	  political	  
arena.	  However,	  I	  still	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  participants	  will	  look	  at	  Israel	  as	  an	  all-­‐
important	  voting	  issue,	  so	  even	  if	  they	  care	  deeply	  about	  Israeli	  support,	  it	  may	  not	  
be	  enough	  to	  trump	  their	  views	  on	  domestic	  issues	  or	  even	  other	  foreign	  policy	  
issues.	  Such	  a	  result	  would	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  there	  are	  no	  long-­‐term	  effects	  
on	  behavior	  —	  it’s	  very	  possible	  Israel	  will	  become	  a	  much	  more	  important	  voting	  
issue	  in	  the	  future,	  or	  maybe	  domestic	  issues	  will	  become	  less	  important,	  in	  which	  
case	  a	  former	  participant’s	  attitude	  regarding	  Israel	  would	  matter	  a	  great	  deal	  more.	  
However,	  in	  the	  short-­‐term,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  political	  behavior	  changes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
Taglit-­‐Birthright	  participation.	  




	   The	  main	  focus	  for	  determining	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  trip	  to	  Israel	  on	  political	  
attitude	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  subjects	  felt	  more	  conservative	  or	  liberal	  ideologically	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  support	  for	  Israel.	  Per	  the	  methods	  section,	  I	  compared	  the	  
responses	  of	  the	  more	  Jewish	  group	  that	  had	  been	  to	  Israel	  with	  the	  more	  Jewish	  
group	  that	  had	  not	  been	  to	  Israel,	  and	  I	  did	  the	  same	  between	  the	  two	  less	  Jewish	  
groups	  as	  well.	  As	  expected,	  it	  does	  appear	  that	  subjects	  who	  have	  been	  to	  Israel	  are	  
at	  least	  slightly	  more	  likely	  to	  alter	  their	  overall	  political	  attitude	  with	  Israel	  in	  mind.	  
Below	  are	  the	  summarized	  statistics	  from	  the	  first	  comparison,	  between	  the	  two	  
more-­‐Jewish	  groups.	  Many	  open-­‐ended	  responses	  were	  coded	  to	  represent	  the	  
intentions	  of	  the	  subject.	  5	  
Identified ideology Israel No Israel 
Liberal 68.2% 62.5% 
Conservative 9.1% 12.5% 
Moderate 22.7% 25.0% 
Israel affects attitude?     
No 75.0% 87.5% 
Yes 25.0% 12.5% 
Table	  1:	  More-­Jewish	  political	  attitude	  comparison	  
	   For	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  results	  regarding	  how	  Israel	  affects	  political	  attitude	  is	  
consistent	  with	  the	  subjects’	  identified	  ideologies,	  which	  were	  determined	  four	  
questions	  prior.	  In	  the	  Israel	  group,	  for	  example,	  there	  were	  five	  subjects	  who	  
indicated	  that	  Israel	  affects	  their	  overall	  political	  attitude,	  and	  of	  those	  five,	  four	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  There	  were	  a	  few	  subjects	  who	  indicated	  a	  struggle	  between	  identifying	  
themselves	  as	  liberals	  versus	  identifying	  themselves	  as	  moderates	  by	  listing	  them	  
both	  in	  their	  answer.	  Those	  subjects	  were	  considered	  moderates,	  as	  they	  were	  
decidedly	  more	  so	  than	  other	  subjects	  who	  put	  just	  liberal,	  and	  others	  who	  said	  that	  
they	  were	  very	  liberal.	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explained	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  that	  their	  allegiance	  to	  Israel	  makes	  them	  feel	  
more	  conservative6.	  Those	  four	  subjects	  consisted	  of	  the	  only	  two	  conservatives	  of	  
the	  group,	  as	  well	  as	  two	  of	  the	  five	  total	  moderates.	  That	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  host	  of	  
research	  presented	  previously,	  which	  indicates	  that	  support	  for	  Israel	  is	  more	  
consistent	  with	  conservative	  ideologies,	  or	  support	  for	  Israel	  is	  at	  least	  not	  so	  
consistent	  with	  liberal	  ideologies	  (Wald,	  Feingold,	  Auerbach).	  However,	  the	  fifth	  
subject	  in	  the	  Israel	  group	  that	  indicated	  being	  affected	  by	  supporting	  Israel	  was	  
previously	  identified	  as	  a	  liberal,	  and	  the	  subject	  indicated	  being	  more	  liberal	  
precisely	  because	  of	  that	  support.	  This	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  what	  previous	  research	  
has	  implied	  about	  political	  attitudes.	  The	  subject’s	  responses	  lacked	  sufficient	  
explanations	  for	  such	  viewpoints,	  so	  I	  contacted	  the	  subject	  for	  a	  follow-­‐up	  
interview	  to	  dig	  deeper	  on	  this	  issue:	  
I’d	  say	  it’s	  because	  in	  Israel,	  on	  Birthright,	  despite	  it	  being	  a	  Jewish	  state	  we	  
spoke	  to	  non-­‐Jews	  too.	  It	  struck	  me	  as	  interesting	  that	  these	  people	  willingly	  
chose	  to	  live	  in	  a	  land	  dominated	  by	  a	  different	  religion	  and	  culture.	  So	  I’d	  
say	  I	  was	  probably	  thinking	  of	  a	  government	  free	  from	  religious	  beliefs,	  as	  I	  
was	  impressed	  that	  people	  from	  other	  religions	  found	  a	  homeland	  in	  Israel	  
as	  well.	  I’m	  sure	  there	  were	  other	  reasons,	  but	  that’s	  one	  I	  remembered	  right	  
away.	  
	  
Such	  a	  viewpoint	  demonstrates	  the	  complexity	  of	  Israel’s	  situation.	  Commonly,	  
American	  liberals	  denounce	  Israel’s	  pre-­‐emptive	  and	  sometimes	  questionable	  use	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Subjects	  were	  not	  always	  particularly	  clear	  about	  how	  Israel	  affected	  their	  overall	  
political	  attitude.	  I	  established	  that	  four	  of	  the	  five	  were	  more	  conservative:	  two	  
indicated	  that	  clearly,	  while	  the	  other	  two	  merely	  indicated	  that	  Israel	  is	  an	  
important	  political	  issue	  and	  they	  want	  what’s	  best	  for	  Israel.	  However,	  of	  those	  
latter	  two,	  I	  determined	  through	  the	  context	  of	  their	  other	  answers	  that	  they	  believe	  
conservatism	  is	  indeed	  better	  for	  Israel.	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military	  force,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  continued	  occupation	  of	  the	  West	  Bank.	  Remember,	  
American	  Jews	  are	  very	  much	  influenced	  by	  their	  immigrant	  roots,	  and	  many	  of	  
them	  embrace	  liberalism	  because	  liberalism	  embraces	  the	  egalitarian	  values	  that	  
allowed	  them	  to	  succeed	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Today,	  many	  of	  those	  Jews	  feel	  that	  
the	  Israeli	  government	  acts	  in	  ways	  that	  blatantly	  oppose	  those	  values.	  However,	  
there	  are	  others,	  like	  the	  subject	  whose	  viewpoint	  is	  presented	  above,	  who	  
recognize	  that	  Israeli	  politics	  is	  not	  completely	  devoid	  of	  such	  values.	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  trips,	  though	  they	  may	  intend	  to	  remain	  apolitical	  and	  uncontroversial,	  do	  
present	  some	  of	  the	  facts	  to	  their	  students.	  Currently,	  roughly	  one-­‐fifth	  of	  the	  Israeli	  
population	  is	  comprised	  of	  Arabs,	  and	  many	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trips	  make	  it	  an	  
objective	  to	  at	  least	  briefly	  introduce	  the	  participants	  to	  non-­‐Jewish	  citizens.	  
Additionally,	  Israel	  undeniably	  has	  a	  much	  better	  record	  on	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  of	  
social	  justice,	  especially	  women’s	  rights,	  than	  most	  other	  Middle	  Eastern	  
governments.	  
	   For	  the	  more-­‐Jewish	  group	  that	  had	  not	  been	  to	  Israel,	  there	  were	  actually	  no	  
subjects	  who	  clearly	  indicated	  that	  their	  political	  attitudes	  were	  affected	  by	  support	  
of	  Israel.	  However,	  there	  was	  one	  subject	  (which,	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  subjects	  in	  the	  
group	  who	  skipped	  some	  answers,	  accounted	  for	  12.5	  percent	  of	  the	  group),	  who	  
indicated	  being	  “sometimes”	  affected.	  A	  request	  for	  a	  follow-­‐up	  interview	  went	  
unanswered,	  but	  through	  the	  context	  of	  other	  answers,	  there	  is	  some	  indication	  of	  
how	  the	  subject’s	  views	  are	  affected.	  The	  subject,	  who	  was	  self-­‐identified	  as	  a	  
moderate,	  indicated	  that	  her	  biggest	  concern	  for	  Israel	  was	  finding	  a	  long-­‐term	  plan	  
for	  non-­‐Jewish	  Israelis/Palestinians	  and	  Jewish	  Israelis	  to	  live	  in	  peace	  with	  one	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another.	  Additionally,	  the	  subject	  said,	  “It	  is	  a	  big	  turnoff	  for	  me	  if	  a	  candidate	  
expresses	  his	  support	  for	  Israel	  by	  showing	  he	  is	  anti-­‐Palestinian.”	  That	  statement	  is	  
more	  applicable	  to	  political	  behavior	  than	  to	  political	  attitude,	  but	  such	  a	  sentiment	  
suggests	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  for	  Israelis	  and	  
Palestinians	  —	  a	  solution	  put	  forth	  by	  liberals	  more	  often	  than	  conservatives.	  This	  
may	  be	  an	  indicator	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  in	  fact	  more	  liberal	  because	  of	  her	  support	  for	  
Israel	  7,	  as	  she	  believes	  a	  primarily	  liberal	  foreign	  policy	  agenda	  is	  the	  answer	  for	  
driving	  long-­‐term	  peace.	  However,	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  doesn’t	  always	  conform	  to	  a	  
perfect	  ideological	  split.	  There	  are	  some	  conservative	  Republican	  politicians	  —	  
Secretary	  of	  Defense	  and	  former	  Nebraska	  senator	  Chuck	  Hagel,	  for	  example	  —	  who	  
are	  outspoken	  supporters	  of	  a	  two-­‐state	  proposal.	  Thus,	  general	  assumptions	  can	  be	  
made	  about	  the	  subject’s	  ideological	  movements	  as	  a	  function	  of	  her	  support	  for	  
Israel,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  concrete.	  
	   The	  comparison	  between	  the	  two	  less-­‐Jewish	  groups	  looks	  relatively	  similar	  
to	  that	  of	  the	  more-­‐Jewish	  groups.	  Below	  are	  the	  summarized	  statistics	  for	  the	  
political	  attitude	  comparison:	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  subject	  did	  mention	  in	  a	  previous	  question	  that	  she	  is	  very	  supportive	  of	  Israel,	  
even	  at	  times	  when	  she	  does	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  country’s	  actions.	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Identified ideology Israel No Israel 
Liberal 58.3% 58.3% 
Conservative 0.0% 16.7% 
Moderate 41.7% 25.0% 
Israel affects attitude?     
No 58.3% 83.3% 
Yes 33.3% 16.7% 
Table	  2:	  Less-­Jewish	  political	  attitude	  comparison8	  
Just	  as	  the	  comparison	  between	  the	  more-­‐Jewish	  groups	  revealed,	  the	  less-­‐Jewish	  
group	  that	  has	  been	  to	  Israel	  is	  slightly	  more	  likely	  than	  the	  less-­‐Jewish	  group	  that	  
has	  not	  been	  to	  Israel	  to	  be	  ideologically	  affected	  by	  support	  of	  Israel.	  However,	  
there	  was	  little	  indication	  that	  those	  subjects	  self-­‐identified	  as	  being	  affected	  were	  
more	  conservative	  because	  of	  their	  support	  for	  Israel.	  In	  this	  comparison,	  it	  was	  
more	  difficult	  to	  discern	  if	  an	  affected	  subject	  moved	  to	  the	  right	  or	  to	  the	  left,	  and	  
for	  the	  discernable	  ones,	  it	  was	  more	  likely	  he/she	  moved	  to	  the	  left.	  
	   For	  the	  less-­‐Jewish	  group	  that	  has	  been	  to	  Israel,	  four	  subjects	  indicated	  that	  
they	  are	  affected	  by	  their	  support	  of	  Israel.	  Of	  those	  four,	  one	  clearly	  specified	  that	  
support	  of	  Israel	  makes	  her	  feel	  more	  liberal.	  The	  other	  three	  indicated	  that	  they	  
struggle	  with	  the	  issue	  and	  that	  they	  want	  to	  support	  viewpoints	  that	  are	  best	  for	  
Israel,	  but	  there	  was	  not	  a	  clear	  movement	  to	  the	  right	  or	  to	  the	  left	  in	  order	  to	  
secure	  what	  is	  best	  for	  Israel.	  One	  of	  them	  was	  particularly	  elaborate	  on	  why	  she	  
struggles	  with	  the	  issue:	  
Yes	  (I	  am	  affected)	  —	  I	  think	  this	  largely	  stems	  from	  the	  influence	  I	  receive	  
at	  home,	  in	  that	  my	  political	  views	  as	  (they)	  relate	  to	  the	  conflict	  are	  quite	  
conservative.	  However,	  I'm	  also	  at	  a	  period	  where	  I'm	  questioning	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  For	  the	  less-­‐Jewish	  group	  that	  has	  been	  to	  Israel,	  the	  percentages	  for	  Israel	  
affecting	  attitude	  (no	  and	  yes)	  do	  not	  add	  up	  to	  100%	  because	  there	  was	  one	  subject	  
who	  indicated	  being	  unsure.	  A	  request	  for	  a	  follow-­‐up	  interview	  went	  unanswered,	  
and	  context	  from	  other	  questions	  was	  unreliable.	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approach	  as	  (it)	  relates	  to	  Israel	  —	  clearly	  something	  needs	  to	  change.	  I	  
have	  a	  cousin	  who	  took	  part	  in	  the	  seeds	  of	  peace	  program	  that	  brings	  Israeli	  
and	  Palestinian	  children	  together	  for	  a	  summer.	  Here,	  they	  get	  to	  know	  each	  
other	  as	  individuals	  and	  not	  as	  members	  of	  an	  opposing	  party,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  
sort	  of	  initiative	  (separate	  from	  a	  conservative	  vs.	  liberal	  mindset)	  that	  I	  try	  
to	  stress.	  I	  realize	  its	  extremely	  idealistic,	  but	  with	  such	  complexities	  and	  
never-­‐ending	  conflict,	  it	  feels	  ok	  to	  be	  somewhat	  idealistic.	  
Such	  a	  viewpoint	  provides	  further	  evidence	  that	  former	  research	  suggesting	  that	  
conservatism	  is	  more	  in	  line	  with	  support	  of	  Israel	  than	  liberalism,	  as	  presented	  in	  
the	  review	  of	  literature,	  may	  be	  somewhat	  outdated.	  As	  conflict	  between	  Israelis	  
and	  Palestinians	  persist,	  it	  appears	  that	  some	  young	  American	  Jews	  feel	  the	  status	  
quo	  of	  Palestinian	  alienation	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  answer.	  Such	  a	  sentiment	  has	  led	  some	  
strong	  supporters	  of	  Israel	  to	  lean	  more	  to	  the	  left	  (or	  at	  least	  not	  to	  the	  right)	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  their	  support	  because	  conservatism	  often	  pushes	  for	  the	  status	  quo.	  
Responses	  like	  the	  one	  above	  intimate	  that	  Jews	  are	  starting	  to	  feel	  that	  more	  liberal	  
ideas,	  like	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution,	  are	  just	  as	  congruous	  with	  Israeli	  support	  as	  
conservative	  ideas.	  And	  in	  some	  cases,	  Jews	  are	  starting	  to	  believe	  that	  those	  liberal	  
ideas	  are	  precisely	  what	  Israel	  needs	  to	  secure	  a	  more	  stable	  future	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East.	  That	  sentiment	  was	  echoed	  in	  the	  less-­‐Jewish	  group	  that	  had	  not	  been	  Israel,	  in	  
which	  just	  two	  subjects	  indicated	  that	  they	  were	  affected	  by	  support	  of	  Israel.	  Of	  
those	  two,	  one	  clearly	  expressed	  being	  more	  liberal	  as	  a	  function	  of	  his	  support	  for	  
Israel,	  and	  the	  other	  merely	  indicated	  that	  he	  is	  interested	  in	  what	  is	  best	  for	  Israel.	  
Again,	  there	  was	  no	  indication	  of	  movement	  to	  the	  right.	  
	   Ultimately,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  attitudes	  of	  subjects	  who	  had	  
been	  to	  Israel	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  support	  of	  Israel	  than	  subjects	  who	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had	  not	  been	  to	  Israel,	  most	  were	  unaffected	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  had	  been	  or	  
not.	  The	  most	  common	  explanation	  given	  amongst	  those	  who	  said	  they	  were	  
unaffected	  was	  that	  even	  though	  they	  support	  Israel’s	  interests,	  such	  support	  is	  not	  
important	  or	  strong	  enough	  in	  determining	  an	  overall	  ideological	  stance.	  Many	  of	  
those	  subjects	  are	  self-­‐identified	  liberals	  who	  admit	  to	  being	  more	  conservative	  in	  
their	  views	  regarding	  Israel,	  but	  such	  views	  are	  not	  influential	  enough	  to	  actually	  
push	  them	  to	  the	  right	  overall.	  Other	  subjects	  said	  their	  political	  stance	  was	  
unaffected	  because	  the	  U.S.	  will	  always	  support	  Israel,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  
conservatism	  or	  liberalism	  is	  the	  ruling	  ideology	  in	  Congress	  and	  the	  White	  House.	  
The	  response	  below,	  though	  it	  pertains	  more	  to	  political	  behavior	  (voting)	  than	  
attitude,	  is	  indicative	  of	  such	  a	  sentiment:	  
It	  seems	  that	  most	  Jewish	  Americans	  who	  treat	  Israel	  as	  a	  hot-­‐button	  issue	  
lean	  Republican.	  This	  never	  made	  any	  sense	  to	  me.	  Why	  support	  Republican	  
candidates	  when	  the	  difference	  between	  them	  and	  Democrats’	  views	  on	  
Israel	  is	  marginal	  at	  best(?)	  Republican	  candidates	  are	  more	  vocal	  about	  
their	  support	  so	  they	  can	  pander	  to	  certain	  sectors	  of	  their	  base.	  Obama	  is	  
no	  less	  supportive	  of	  Israel	  than	  Romney.	  To	  say	  otherwise	  would	  be	  
ignorant.	  
Other	  unaffected	  subjects	  didn’t	  even	  address	  the	  issue	  from	  a	  left-­‐right	  perspective,	  
saying	  that	  it	  is	  somewhat	  imprudent	  to	  be	  affected	  politically	  by	  the	  issues	  of	  a	  U.S.	  
ally,	  instead	  of	  basing	  your	  ideological	  stance	  on	  domestic	  issues	  like	  jobs	  and	  health	  
care.	  That	  response	  might	  be	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  temporal	  influence	  on	  this	  survey,	  
which	  was	  administered	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  2012	  U.S.	  presidential	  election	  
(some	  were	  given	  before	  and	  some	  after).	  With	  the	  2012	  campaign	  in	  mind,	  many	  
subjects	  probably	  considered	  domestic	  issues	  regarding	  jobs,	  health	  care,	  gun	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control	  and	  disaster	  relief	  (hurricane	  Sandy)	  to	  be	  more	  important	  issues	  than	  Israel	  




	   After	  asking	  how	  support	  for	  Israel	  affects	  the	  subjects’	  political	  attitudes,	  
subjects	  were	  then	  asked	  if	  their	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  how	  they	  would	  vote	  in	  
national	  elections.	  This	  was	  my	  main	  evaluation	  in	  determining	  how	  a	  trip	  to	  Israel	  
affects	  the	  political	  behavior	  of	  young	  American	  Jews.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  I	  
hypothesized	  that	  unlike	  political	  attitude,	  behavior	  would	  go	  unaffected.	  That	  is,	  I	  
did	  not	  believe	  there	  would	  be	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  political	  behavior	  between	  
the	  more-­‐Jewish-­‐Israel	  group	  and	  the	  more-­‐Jewish-­‐no-­‐Israel	  group,	  nor	  would	  there	  
be	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  less-­‐Jewish-­‐Israel	  group	  and	  the	  less-­‐Jewish-­‐
no-­‐Israel	  group.	  The	  data	  confirmed	  that	  prediction,	  and	  explanations	  that	  subjects	  
gave	  for	  their	  behavior	  were	  relatively	  similar	  from	  group	  to	  group.	  
More Jewish Israel No Israel 
No 70.0% 75.0% 
Yes 30.0% 25.0% 
Less Jewish    
No 75.0% 83.3% 
Yes 16.7% 16.7% 
Table	  3:	  “Do	  your	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  your	  vote	  in	  national	  elections?”	  -­-­	  all	  groups9	  
For	  the	  two	  more-­‐Jewish	  groups,	  most	  of	  the	  responses	  were	  consistent	  with	  
what	  the	  subjects	  said	  in	  regards	  to	  their	  political	  attitude.	  For	  example,	  as	  
mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  there	  were	  five	  subjects	  in	  the	  more-­‐Jewish-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  For	  the	  less-­‐Jewish	  group	  that	  has	  been	  to	  Israel,	  the	  percentages	  for	  Israel	  
affecting	  attitude	  (no	  and	  yes)	  do	  not	  add	  up	  to	  100%	  because	  there	  was	  one	  subject	  
who	  indicated	  being	  unsure.	  A	  request	  for	  a	  follow-­‐up	  interview	  went	  unanswered,	  
and	  context	  from	  other	  questions	  was	  unreliable.	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Israel	  group	  who	  indicated	  that	  support	  of	  Israel	  affected	  their	  attitudes.	  Those	  
same	  five	  subsequently	  answered	  in	  this	  question	  that	  support	  of	  Israel	  also	  affects	  
their	  vote	  in	  national	  elections,	  and	  they	  would	  vote	  in	  ways	  that	  reflect	  their	  
attitude	  shift.	  For	  example,	  the	  subject	  who	  had	  indicated	  that	  support	  of	  Israel	  
makes	  him	  feel	  more	  conservative	  also	  said	  that	  support	  of	  Israel	  encourages	  him	  to	  
vote	  for	  the	  conservative	  candidate.	  The	  subjects	  who	  merely	  indicated	  in	  the	  
attitude	  question	  that	  they	  want	  what	  is	  best	  for	  Israel	  also	  said	  they	  would	  vote	  in	  a	  
way	  they	  feel	  is	  best	  for	  Israel.	  Interestingly,	  there	  was	  a	  sixth	  subject	  in	  this	  group	  
who	  had	  not	  indicated	  an	  attitude	  effect	  but	  nonetheless	  said	  that	  his	  views	  on	  Israel	  
would	  affect	  whom	  he	  votes	  for	  in	  national	  elections.	  However,	  his	  explanation	  
suggests	  that	  the	  effect	  is	  conditional,	  not	  absolute:	  “If	  a	  candidate	  was	  anti-­‐Israel,	  I	  
would	  not	  vote	  for	  them.”	  But	  what	  exactly	  is	  the	  metric	  for	  how	  that	  subject	  
determines	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  candidate	  is	  anti-­‐Israel?	  It	  is	  quite	  possible	  that	  the	  
subject	  has	  never	  actually	  seen	  a	  candidate,	  nor	  will	  he	  ever	  see	  a	  candidate,	  who	  
meets	  his	  criteria	  for	  being	  anti-­‐Israel.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  his	  condition	  is	  merely	  
hypothetical	  and	  doesn’t	  actually	  reflect	  a	  behavioral	  effect.	  	  
However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  his	  metric	  is	  more	  sensitive.	  Perhaps	  he	  
considered	  Barack	  Obama	  to	  be	  an	  anti-­‐Israel	  candidate	  merely	  because	  the	  White	  
House	  denied	  a	  request	  from	  Israeli	  Prime	  Minister	  Bibi	  Netanyahu	  to	  meet	  while	  he	  
was	  on	  a	  trip	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  in	  September	  2012.	  A	  request	  
for	  a	  follow-­‐up	  interview	  went	  unanswered.	  Because	  of	  the	  conditional	  nature	  of	  the	  
subject’s	  response,	  it	  was	  still	  considered	  positive	  for	  a	  behavioral	  effect,	  but	  it	  was	  
a	  softer	  effect	  than	  others	  who	  indicated	  a	  behavioral	  effect	  in	  the	  more-­‐Jewish-­‐
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Israel	  group.	  For	  example,	  another	  subject	  explained,	  “I	  am	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  a	  
candidate	  who	  has	  been	  vocal	  in	  his/her	  support	  of	  Israel.”	  This	  response	  is	  
somewhat	  similar	  in	  that	  the	  subject	  supports	  the	  more	  pro-­‐Israel	  candidate,	  but	  the	  
behavior	  is	  not	  contingent	  on	  one	  of	  the	  candidates	  being	  anti-­‐Israel.	  
The	  more-­‐Jewish-­‐no-­‐Israel	  group	  exhibited	  a	  similar	  trend.	  The	  only	  subject	  
who	  indicated	  an	  attitude	  effect	  also	  suggested	  a	  behavioral	  effect.	  As	  discussed	  in	  
the	  last	  section,	  this	  subject	  would	  probably	  not	  vote	  for	  a	  candidate	  who	  expressed	  
his/her	  support	  for	  Israel	  via	  an	  expression	  of	  anti-­‐Palestinian	  sentiment.	  
Additionally,	  there	  was	  another	  subject	  who	  did	  not	  indicate	  an	  attitude	  effect	  but	  
did	  suggest	  a	  conditional	  behavioral	  effect	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  in	  the	  more-­‐
Jewish-­‐Israel	  group.	  That	  is,	  this	  subject	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  vote	  for	  a	  visibly	  anti-­‐
Israel	  candidate.	  A	  request	  for	  a	  follow-­‐up	  interview	  went	  unanswered,	  so	  this	  
subject	  was	  given	  a	  soft-­‐yes	  just	  like	  the	  one	  in	  the	  more-­‐Jewish-­‐Israel	  group.	  It	  is	  
worth	  noting	  that	  even	  though	  my	  prediction	  of	  there	  not	  being	  a	  significant	  
difference	  in	  behavior	  between	  the	  two	  more-­‐Jewish	  groups	  proved	  correct,	  this	  
effect	  was	  ultimately	  not	  achieved	  in	  the	  way	  that	  I	  thought	  it	  would	  be.	  I	  had	  
suspected	  that	  for	  both	  groups,	  some	  of	  the	  subjects	  who	  had	  indicated	  an	  attitude	  
effect	  would	  not	  be	  affected	  behaviorally.	  That	  is,	  I	  believed	  that,	  of	  the	  subjects	  who	  
are	  interested	  in	  what	  is	  best	  for	  Israel,	  at	  least	  some	  would	  still	  not	  consider	  Israel	  
a	  significant	  enough	  voting	  issue	  to	  affect	  behavior.	  Instead,	  all	  of	  subjects	  in	  those	  
two	  groups	  who	  had	  an	  affected	  attitude	  also	  had	  an	  affected	  behavior.	  Perhaps	  the	  
pre-­‐trip	  variables	  that	  classified	  these	  subjects	  as	  more	  Jewish	  (religious	  observance,	  
heavy	  parental	  involvement	  in	  upbringing,	  etc.)	  make	  them	  more	  likely	  to	  connect	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their	  support	  for	  Israel	  to	  a	  particular	  vote.	  And	  ultimately,	  the	  gap	  in	  affected	  
attitude	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  closed	  for	  affected	  behavior	  because	  of	  certain	  
subjects	  who	  indicated	  a	  behavioral	  effect	  even	  though	  there	  was	  no	  attitude	  effect.	  	  
The	  two	  less-­‐Jewish	  groups	  answered	  the	  political	  behavior	  question	  more	  in	  
line	  with	  how	  I	  expected	  they	  would.	  Of	  the	  four	  subjects	  in	  the	  less-­‐Jewish-­‐Israel	  
group	  who	  had	  indicated	  that	  support	  for	  Israel	  affects	  their	  political	  attitudes,	  just	  
two	  of	  them	  felt	  that	  their	  support	  for	  Israel	  also	  affects	  their	  vote.	  One	  of	  them	  
merely	  mentioned	  that	  she	  generally	  intends	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  candidate	  who	  is	  best	  
for	  Israel,	  without	  specifying	  specifically	  what	  is	  best	  for	  Israel.	  And	  the	  other	  votes	  
based	  on	  how	  candidates	  have	  handled	  and	  experienced	  U.S.	  relations	  with	  Israel:	  
In	  this	  particular	  election	  (2012),	  I	  was	  very	  sensitive	  to	  the	  rocky	  
relationship	  Obama	  had	  with	  the	  state	  of	  Israel.	  His	  responses	  to	  Israel’s	  
most	  recent	  (actions)	  against	  Hamas,	  however,	  I	  thought	  were	  very	  sensible	  
and	  in	  line	  with	  an	  invested	  interest	  in	  Israel’s	  right	  to	  defend	  itself	  …	  I	  want	  
(Israelis)	  to	  be	  safe	  and	  to	  be	  able	  to	  live	  in	  a	  place	  with	  peace	  and	  
fulfillment,	  just	  like	  I	  have	  here	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
The	  other	  two	  subjects	  gave	  separate	  explanations	  for	  why	  they	  were	  positive	  for	  an	  
attitude	  effect	  but	  negative	  for	  a	  behavioral	  effect.	  The	  first	  said	  that	  domestic	  issues	  
are	  simply	  more	  important	  voting	  issues	  in	  U.S.	  presidential	  elections	  than	  policies	  
regarding	  Israel.	  This	  was	  a	  sentiment	  echoed	  by	  many	  of	  the	  subjects	  who	  
answered	  “no”	  to	  this	  question,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  had	  indicated	  an	  
attitude	  effect.	  Many	  young	  Diaspora	  Jews	  support	  Israel	  and	  want	  what’s	  best	  for	  it,	  
but	  they	  feel	  they	  have	  a	  priority	  to	  consider	  their	  actual	  homeland	  —	  not	  
necessarily	  the	  Biblical	  homeland.	  The	  other	  subject	  in	  this	  group	  with	  an	  attitude	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effect	  but	  no	  behavioral	  effect	  said	  she	  wasn’t	  sure	  if	  Israel	  would	  be	  enough	  to	  
“sway”	  her	  in	  an	  election.	  In	  a	  follow-­‐up	  interview,	  she	  elaborated	  on	  this	  response:	  
This	  is	  a	  difficult	  question	  for	  me	  to	  answer	  because	  I	  don’t	  fully	  know	  where	  
I	  stand	  on	  the	  political	  spectrum	  yet,	  but	  I	  guess	  what	  I	  mean	  is	  that	  my	  view	  
on	  Israel	  (in	  this	  case	  my	  support)	  is	  definitely	  something	  I	  factor	  into	  my	  
political	  opinion.	  If	  a	  candidate	  were	  entirely	  anti-­‐Israel	  and	  extreme,	  that	  
could	  easily	  be	  enough	  to	  sway	  me	  to	  change	  my	  vote.	  However,	  I	  don’t	  think	  
it	  is	  likely	  that	  a	  candidate	  in	  today’s	  society	  would	  ever	  be	  completely	  anti-­‐
Israel,	  so	  I	  guess	  my	  practical	  answer	  is	  that	  I	  wouldn’t	  change	  a	  vote	  over	  it.	  
This	  response	  is	  akin	  to	  the	  conditional-­‐yes	  responses	  seen	  in	  the	  two	  more-­‐Jewish	  
groups,	  but	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  subject	  specified	  that	  such	  a	  condition	  would	  not	  occur	  
in	  U.S.	  politics	  and	  was	  thus	  counted	  as	  negative	  for	  a	  behavioral	  effect.	  Many	  of	  the	  
subjects	  replied	  similarly,	  saying	  that	  any	  candidate	  in	  a	  national	  election	  would	  be	  
supportive	  of	  Israel,	  so	  supporting	  Israel	  as	  a	  voter	  would	  not	  be	  conducive	  to	  any	  
particular	  candidate.	  Ultimately,	  the	  less-­‐Jewish-­‐Israel	  group,	  a	  third	  of	  whom	  had	  
exhibited	  an	  attitude	  effect,	  had	  the	  same	  percentage	  of	  behaviorally	  affected	  





	   Prior	  to	  asking	  subjects	  questions	  about	  their	  personal	  political	  attitudes	  and	  
behaviors,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  dig	  into	  their	  Jewish	  upbringing	  to	  find	  if	  there	  were	  
any	  compelling	  relationships	  between	  those	  answers	  and	  any	  specific	  pre-­‐trip	  
variables.	  Parental	  involvement,	  for	  example,	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  because	  of	  the	  
unique	  nature	  of	  the	  Jewish	  parent-­‐child	  relationship.	  As	  was	  discussed	  in	  the	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literature	  review,	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  American	  Jewish	  parents	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  
involved	  and	  influential	  early	  in	  their	  children’s	  lives	  than	  American	  non-­‐Jewish	  
parents	  (Lerner,	  Cherlin).	  For	  that	  reason,	  parental	  involvement	  in	  Jewish	  
upbringing	  was	  a	  coding	  factor	  in	  determining	  the	  group	  cutoff	  between	  more-­‐
Jewish	  and	  less-­‐Jewish	  subjects.	  But	  in	  order	  to	  make	  such	  a	  factor	  more	  applicable	  
to	  the	  overall	  objective	  of	  this	  study,	  there	  was	  a	  section	  of	  the	  survey	  that	  looked	  
further	  into	  the	  dynamics	  of	  parental	  involvement,	  specifically	  if	  it	  had	  effects	  on	  the	  
political	  views	  of	  the	  subjects	  —	  not	  just	  the	  religious	  views.	  So,	  the	  survey	  asked	  
subjects	  about	  their	  parents’	  political	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  
as	  their	  own.	  They	  were	  asked,	  “Do	  your	  parents’	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  their	  overall	  
political	  stance	  (i.e.	  —	  are	  they	  more	  conservative/liberal	  overall	  because	  of	  their	  
views	  on	  Israel?)”	  And	  then,	  “Do	  your	  parents’	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  their	  vote	  in	  
national	  elections?”	  After	  each	  question,	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  explain	  their	  
responses.	  This	  way,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  determine	  if	  more-­‐Jewish	  groups	  were	  more	  
likely	  to	  exhibit	  the	  same	  political	  views	  as	  their	  parents.	  Ultimately,	  there	  were	  no	  
major	  cross-­‐group	  differences	  in	  whether	  or	  not	  subjects	  adhered	  to	  the	  attitudes	  
and	  behaviors	  of	  their	  parents:	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Parent No's 92.3% 80.0% 
Parent Yes's 80.0% 85.7% More Jewish; Israel 
Overall 88.9% 82.4% 
      
Parent No's 100.0% 100.0% 
Parent Yes's 33.3% 50.0% More Jewish; No Israel 
Overall 71.4% 71.4% 
      
Parent No's 77.8% 88.9% 
Parent Yes's 100.0% 50.0% Less Jewish; Israel 
Overall 81.8% 81.8% 
      
Parent No's 87.5% 100.0% 
Parent Yes's 33.3% 50.0% Less Jewish; No Israel 
Overall 72.7% 81.8% 
Table	  4:	  Generational	  mobility	  rates	  of	  political	  attitude	  and	  behavior10	  
The	  above	  data	  did	  not	  yield	  any	  significant	  cross-­‐group	  differences	  or	  trends.	  
That	  is,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  a	  subject	  of	  one	  group	  is	  any	  more	  likely	  to	  indicate	  
the	  same	  attitude	  and	  behavioral	  tendencies	  as	  his/her	  parents	  than	  a	  subject	  in	  any	  
other	  group.	  Additionally,	  the	  survey	  asked	  in	  the	  same	  section	  whether,	  during	  
childhood,	  parents	  encouraged	  the	  subject	  to	  pursue	  his/her	  own	  opinions	  
regarding	  Israel	  or	  to	  adopt	  similar	  opinions	  as	  his/her	  parents.	  Previous	  research	  
has	  determined	  that	  American-­‐Jewish	  parents	  tend	  to	  be	  heavily	  involved	  in	  child-­‐
rearing,	  but	  this	  question	  asks	  what	  such	  involvement	  might	  entail.	  Most	  of	  the	  
subjects,	  throughout	  the	  four	  groups,	  indicated	  that	  their	  parents	  encouraged	  them	  
to	  come	  to	  their	  own	  opinions,	  but	  it	  was	  at	  least	  slightly	  more	  likely	  for	  more-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The	  rates	  shown	  in	  the	  table	  represent	  the	  percentage	  of	  subjects	  whose	  support	  
of	  Israel	  affects	  their	  political	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  their	  parents.	  
For	  example,	  92.3	  percent	  of	  subjects	  in	  the	  more-­‐Jewish-­‐Israel	  group	  whose	  
parents	  did	  not	  exhibit	  an	  affected	  attitude	  (Parent	  No’s)	  likewise	  did	  not	  indicate	  
an	  affected	  attitude	  themselves.	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Jewish	  subjects	  to	  have	  parents	  that	  wanted	  their	  children	  to	  adopt	  the	  same	  
viewpoints	  that	  they	  themselves	  espoused.	  	  
Encouragement Direction More Jewish Less Jewish 
Own viewpoints 57.1% 70.8% 
Same viewpoints 35.7% 25.0% 
Both 7.1% 4.2% 
Table	  5:	  Parental	  influence	  on	  viewpoints	  
It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  13	  out	  of	  the	  16	  total	  subjects	  who	  indicated	  that	  their	  
parents	  want	  them	  to	  adopt	  the	  same	  political	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  regarding	  
Israel	  actually	  did	  exhibit	  the	  same	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  themselves	  later	  in	  the	  
survey	  (81.3	  percent).	  Overall,	  however,	  this	  was	  not	  significantly	  different	  than	  the	  
subjects	  whose	  parents	  encouraged	  them	  to	  form	  their	  own	  beliefs	  —	  the	  subjects	  
were	  very	  likely	  to	  adopt	  an	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  similar	  to	  their	  parents’	  
regardless	  of	  what	  they	  were	  encouraged	  to	  do.	  Thus,	  it	  appears	  that	  even	  though	  
there	  is	  a	  correlation	  between	  a	  subject’s	  level	  of	  Jewish-­‐ness	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  that	  subject’s	  parents	  pushed	  their	  viewpoints	  on	  the	  subject,	  there	  is	  no	  
discernable	  effect	  of	  such	  parental	  involvement.	  One	  possible	  explanation	  for	  such	  a	  
phenomenon	  may	  simply	  be	  because	  the	  political	  views	  of	  parents	  have	  ways	  of	  
rubbing	  off	  on	  their	  children	  regardless	  of	  what	  their	  involvement	  entails.	  One	  
subject	  who	  said	  his	  parents	  encouraged	  him	  to	  form	  his	  own	  viewpoints	  explained	  
(and	  others	  echoed	  this	  sentiment):	  
My	  parents	  definitely	  share	  their	  viewpoints	  with	  me,	  but	  have	  not	  forced	  
them	  upon	  me.	  I	  agree	  with	  them	  on	  some	  things,	  but	  I	  am	  completely	  free	  to	  
form	  my	  own	  opinions.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  Israel,	  I	  think	  we	  have	  similar	  
viewpoints	  not	  because	  they	  urged	  them	  on	  me,	  but	  because	  I	  came	  to	  that	  
same	  conclusion.	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In	  a	  way,	  this	  type	  of	  result	  corroborates	  findings	  from	  Cohen	  and	  Kelman	  on	  the	  
birth	  cohort	  effect,	  which	  theorizes	  that	  the	  reason	  young	  American	  Jews	  appear	  to	  
have	  distanced	  themselves	  from	  issues	  regarding	  Israel	  is	  that,	  over	  time,	  American	  
Jews	  have	  become	  less	  connected	  to	  events	  like	  the	  birth	  of	  Israel	  and	  the	  Six-­‐Day	  
War.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  parental	  involvement	  and	  the	  type	  of	  
encouragement	  pursued	  in	  parental	  involvement,	  this	  effect	  exists.	  So,	  it	  appears	  
that	  even	  though	  most	  of	  the	  subjects	  did	  exhibit	  the	  same	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  as	  
their	  parents,	  there	  will	  still	  be	  some	  who	  peel	  off	  in	  a	  different	  direction,	  possibly	  
due	  to	  the	  birth	  cohort	  effect.	  One	  subject	  whose	  views	  differed	  from	  his	  parents	  
even	  though	  they	  urged	  him	  to	  adopt	  the	  same	  viewpoints	  expressed,	  “(My	  parents	  
are)	  a	  lot	  more	  pro-­‐Israel	  than	  I	  am	  and	  don’t	  understand	  why	  my	  views	  are	  shifting	  
and	  they	  think	  I	  should	  always	  support	  Israel.”	  And	  another	  who	  fell	  into	  the	  same	  
category	  said,	  “They	  expect	  me	  to	  have	  the	  same	  opinions,	  and	  I	  have	  not	  yet	  told	  
them	  my	  views	  have	  shifted.”	  
	   Another	  interesting	  finding	  within	  the	  results	  —	  now	  coming	  back	  to	  attitude	  
and	  behavior	  shifts	  among	  the	  subjects	  themselves	  —	  was	  how	  they	  personally	  
believed	  they	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  trip	  to	  Israel.	  As	  described	  in	  the	  methods	  section,	  
the	  survey	  questions	  were	  organized	  so	  that	  I	  could	  objectively	  determine	  each	  
subject’s	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  and	  then	  compare	  responses	  across	  the	  groups.	  I	  
was	  curious	  to	  see	  if	  a	  subjective	  approach	  would	  yield	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  results,	  
so	  I	  added	  two	  questions	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  survey	  to	  be	  answered	  by	  the	  two	  groups	  
who	  have	  traveled	  to	  Israel.	  Would	  the	  groups	  who	  have	  been	  to	  Israel	  think	  they	  
themselves	  were	  affected	  or	  not	  affected	  in	  the	  same	  ways	  that	  I	  assessed	  them	  to	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be?	  In	  order	  to	  figure	  that	  out,	  the	  first	  question	  addressed	  attitude	  and	  asked,	  
“Have	  you	  altered	  your	  political	  views	  based	  on	  information	  you	  learned	  on	  the	  trip,	  
or	  based	  on	  a	  personal	  reaction	  for	  the	  trip?	  If	  so,	  how?”	  And	  the	  second	  question,	  
addressing	  behavior,	  asked,	  “Are	  you	  more	  or	  less	  inclined	  to	  vote	  for	  a	  particular	  
party	  in	  national	  elections	  because	  of	  your	  views	  on	  Israel	  since	  the	  trip?	  Why?”	  
    Attitude effect Behavior effect 
No 60.0% 61.1% 
Yes 35.0% 27.8% More Jewish; Israel 
Not Sure 5.0% 11.1% 
      
No 66.7% 75.0% 
Yes 25.0% 25.0% Less Jewish; Israel 
Not Sure 8.3% 0.0% 
Table	  6:	  The	  trip	  in	  retrospect,	  a	  subjective	  approach	  
For	  the	  most	  part,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  subjective	  approach	  yielded	  very	  similar	  
results	  to	  the	  truer,	  more	  objective	  questions.	  A	  majority	  of	  respondents	  did	  not	  
believe	  their	  attitudes	  nor	  their	  behaviors	  were	  affected	  by	  their	  trips	  to	  Israel.	  
Their	  explanations	  for	  such	  responses	  are	  also	  similar	  to	  answers	  given	  in	  some	  of	  
the	  previous	  questions.	  	  In	  many	  respects,	  the	  trip	  made	  subjects	  feel	  more	  pro-­‐
Israel	  at	  heart,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  political	  attitude	  or	  
behavior.	  
	   Moreover,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  less-­‐Jewish-­‐Israel	  group	  was	  slightly	  
more	  likely	  than	  the	  more-­‐Jewish-­‐Israel	  group	  to	  declare	  itself	  unaffected,	  both	  in	  
attitude	  and	  behavior.	  That	  result	  is	  surprising	  because	  one	  would	  believe	  that	  a	  trip	  
to	  Israel	  would	  have	  the	  most	  profound	  effects	  on	  participants	  who	  are	  less	  
connected	  or	  committed	  to	  their	  faith,	  rather	  than	  on	  those	  who	  may	  already	  have	  
strong	  opinions	  about	  Judaism	  and	  Israel.	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Drawbacks	  
	   It	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  of	  the	  conditions	  surrounding	  the	  administration	  of	  
the	  survey	  for	  this	  study	  at	  least	  slightly	  affected	  the	  findings,	  and	  they	  are	  worth	  
mentioning	  here.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  Israel’s	  conflicts	  with	  
government	  and	  military	  entities	  that	  surround	  it	  are	  very	  much	  ongoing,	  and	  
responses	  may	  have	  been	  affected	  by	  then-­‐current	  events	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  A	  
majority	  of	  the	  respondents	  answered	  the	  survey	  questions	  in	  November	  and	  
December	  of	  2012,	  in	  the	  midst	  and	  aftermath	  of	  Israel’s	  Operation	  Pillar	  of	  Defense.	  
Beginning	  on	  November	  14,	  in	  response	  to	  Palestinian	  militant	  groups	  launching	  
rockets	  from	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  into	  Israeli	  civilian	  territories,	  including	  Tel-­‐Aviv	  and	  
Jerusalem,	  Israel	  Defense	  Forces	  fired	  back	  with	  air	  strikes	  over	  an	  eight-­‐day	  span	  
that	  targeted	  militant	  sites	  operated	  by	  Hamas’s	  armed	  wing	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  
Islamic	  Jihad.	  Even	  though	  the	  targets	  in	  Gaza	  were	  considered	  terror	  sites,	  dozens	  
of	  Palestinian	  civilians	  were	  killed.	  In	  the	  survey,	  many	  respondents	  expressed	  
strong	  sentiments	  of	  Israel	  having	  the	  right	  to	  defend	  itself	  against	  recent	  attacks,	  
and	  some	  pointed	  out	  that	  Israel	  relies	  on	  military	  support	  and	  weapons	  from	  the	  
United	  States.	  Those	  people	  may	  have	  been	  more	  inclined	  to	  indicate	  that	  they	  want	  
to	  vote	  in	  a	  way	  that	  favors	  U.S.	  military	  support	  of	  Israel	  —	  more	  so	  than	  if	  they	  
took	  the	  survey	  prior	  to	  Operation	  Pillar	  of	  Defense	  or	  during	  a	  ceasefire.	  When	  
asked	  how	  supportive	  subjects	  are	  in	  times	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  subjects	  
may	  have	  been	  more	  likely	  to	  respond	  with	  answers	  like,	  “I	  stand	  with	  Israel	  no	  
matter	  what,”	  and	  “I	  believe	  Israel	  has	  a	  right	  to	  protect	  herself.”	  When	  asked	  why	  
Israel	  is	  either	  important	  or	  unimportant	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  voting	  in	  national	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elections,	  a	  subject	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  respond	  with,	  “I	  do	  not	  want	  Israel	  to	  have	  
to	  face	  war	  without	  the	  support	  of	  the	  U.S.”	  
	   Many	  responses	  that	  expressed	  unconditional	  support	  of	  Israel	  in	  times	  of	  
conflict	  were	  balanced	  with	  an	  expression	  of	  dismay	  over	  the	  lives	  lost	  on	  both	  sides	  
of	  the	  battle.	  The	  qualitative	  nature	  of	  these	  responses,	  in	  which	  subjects	  were	  
allowed	  to	  explain	  why	  they	  feel	  and	  act	  the	  way	  they	  do	  in	  the	  political	  arena,	  
showed	  that	  perhaps	  their	  responses	  would	  be	  different	  if	  the	  survey	  were	  taken	  
during	  a	  time	  of	  relative	  peace	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  For	  example,	  a	  number	  of	  
respondents	  may	  have	  favored	  a	  diplomatic	  solution	  to	  violence	  that	  includes	  a	  two-­‐
state	  solution	  —	  a	  decidedly	  more	  liberal	  policy	  agenda	  —	  but	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  
Operation,	  such	  opinions	  were	  more	  tempered.	  One	  subject	  wrote	  that	  traveling	  to	  
Israel	  and	  learning	  more	  about	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  conflict	  “helped	  me	  realize	  
that	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  is	  the	  best	  option	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  it	  will	  
work	  right	  now.”	  Another	  subject	  who	  had	  travelled	  to	  Israel	  felt	  similarly	  about	  
finding	  a	  diplomatic	  solution,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  also	  felt	  Israel	  had	  a	  right	  to	  defend	  
itself,	  saying,	  “I	  learned	  (on	  the	  trip)	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Arabs	  are	  extremely	  
nice	  people	  who	  are	  extremely	  similar	  to	  me,	  more	  so	  than	  I	  thought	  they’d	  be	  …	  
Israel	  needs	  to	  go	  further	  out	  of	  its	  way	  to	  prevent	  civilian	  casualties	  when	  engaging	  
terrorist	  organizations.”	  If	  the	  survey	  were	  taken	  a	  year	  ago,	  or	  perhaps	  today,	  these	  
subjects	  may	  feel	  that	  diplomatic	  solutions	  are	  more	  attainable,	  and	  their	  responses	  
may	  be	  different.	  
	   Another	  factor	  that	  may	  have	  altered	  the	  results	  of	  this	  survey	  is	  an	  apparent	  
selection	  bias.	  That	  is,	  it	  appears	  that	  certain	  Jews	  who	  received	  a	  request	  to	  answer	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the	  survey	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  others	  to	  actually	  fill	  it	  out.	  For	  example,	  nearly	  
half	  of	  respondents	  reported	  being	  conservative	  Jews	  (in	  the	  religious	  sense),	  which	  
seems	  like	  a	  disproportionally	  high	  percentage	  compared	  to	  the	  American	  Jewish	  
community	  at	  large.	  Literature	  suggests	  that	  from	  generation-­‐to-­‐generation	  from	  
the	  time	  Jews	  immigrated	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  American	  Jewish	  religion	  has	  
been	  modified	  from	  Orthodoxy	  to	  Conservatism	  to	  Reform.	  Ritterband	  wrote,	  “The	  
Reform	  movement	  is	  rapidly	  becoming	  the	  modal	  Jewish	  religious	  identity	  for	  the	  
mass	  of	  American	  Jews.”	  The	  National	  Jewish	  Population	  Survey	  published	  in	  2005	  
showed	  that	  34	  percent	  of	  the	  American	  Jewish	  population	  was	  Reform,	  and	  26	  
percent	  was	  Conservative;	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population	  was	  split	  between	  Orthodox,	  
Reconstructionist	  and	  Just	  Jewish	  (Ament	  9).	  It	  is	  some	  cause	  for	  concern	  that	  the	  
survey	  reached	  more	  Conservative	  Jews	  than	  Reform	  Jews	  because	  there	  are	  a	  
number	  of	  possible	  differences	  in	  their	  respective	  upbringings.	  Conservative	  Jews	  
are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  formal	  Hebrew	  education,	  and	  such	  education	  is	  generally	  
more	  formal	  than	  corresponding	  education	  in	  the	  Reform	  denomination.	  Holiday	  
observance	  and	  parental	  involvement	  in	  Jewish	  upbringing	  are	  also	  typically	  
stronger	  in	  Conservative	  Jewish	  families	  (Keysar,	  et	  al.	  38-­‐41).	  However,	  much	  of	  
this	  selection	  bias	  was	  likely	  limited	  due	  to	  how	  subjects	  were	  split	  across	  groups.	  
The	  initial	  identification	  questions	  helped	  determine	  each	  subject’s	  pre-­‐trip	  
variables	  (like	  Conservative	  Judaism	  and	  its	  associated	  effects)	  so	  that	  comparisons	  
could	  be	  made	  between	  similar-­‐minded	  Jews.	  Even	  though	  more	  Conservative	  Jews	  
answered	  the	  survey	  than	  Reform	  Jews,	  it	  was	  unlikely	  that	  the	  responses	  of	  a	  very	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religious	  Conservative	  Jew	  were	  compared	  closely	  with	  those	  of	  a	  non-­‐practicing	  
Reform	  Jew.	  
	   Lastly,	  even	  though	  the	  survey	  reached	  many	  Jews	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Michigan,	  response	  rate	  was	  low,	  and	  survey	  data	  was	  relatively	  limited.	  Seventy-­‐
two	  students	  opened	  the	  survey	  and	  answered	  some	  of	  the	  questions,	  but	  just	  52	  
responses	  were	  actually	  answered	  sufficiently	  enough	  to	  analyze	  political	  attitude	  
and	  behavior.	  This	  problem	  was	  foreseen	  and	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  the	  
survey	  was	  so	  open-­‐ended	  —	  the	  subjects	  who	  did	  complete	  the	  survey	  in	  its	  
entirety	  did	  elaborate	  on	  most	  of	  their	  responses,	  explaining	  their	  personal	  
circumstances	  and	  opinions.	  The	  qualitative	  nature	  of	  such	  responses	  provided	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  determine	  if,	  how,	  and	  why	  opinions	  varied	  from	  group	  to	  group,	  and	  
many	  snippets	  were	  included	  in	  the	  findings	  so	  as	  to	  represent	  the	  viewpoints	  of	  a	  
number	  of	  subjects.	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Conclusion	  and	  Discussion	  
	   	  
	   Because	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  has	  already	  provided	  trips	  for	  over	  300,000	  young	  
adult	  Jews	  from	  all	  over	  the	  globe,	  it	  is	  well	  worth	  the	  effort	  to	  investigate	  the	  
various	  effects	  that	  the	  program	  has	  on	  its	  participants.	  Many	  travelers	  find	  the	  trip	  
to	  be	  life-­‐changing	  —	  having	  finally	  experienced	  first-­‐hand	  the	  Western	  Wall	  in	  
Jerusalem,	  the	  bustling	  city	  of	  Tel	  Aviv,	  the	  scenery	  and	  symbolism	  of	  Mount	  Masada	  
and	  the	  Dead	  Sea,	  and	  the	  similarities	  they	  share	  with	  their	  Israeli	  peers,	  
participants	  come	  home	  with	  an	  enriched	  sense	  of	  commitment	  to	  Israel	  and	  
Judaism.	  Later	  in	  life,	  it’s	  probable	  that	  that	  commitment	  will	  manifest	  itself	  in	  
former	  participants	  marrying	  in-­‐faith	  and	  raising	  their	  children	  Jewish.	  But	  this	  
study	  adds	  a	  new	  layer	  to	  the	  analysis	  by	  treating	  former	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  
participants	  as	  members	  of	  the	  U.S.	  political	  landscape.	  Whether	  the	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  program	  has	  political	  motivations	  is	  debatable,	  but	  regardless,	  the	  
funding	  and	  leadership	  of	  the	  organization	  is	  derived	  from	  politically	  charged	  
sources.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  worth	  finding	  whether	  the	  participants’	  enriched	  commitment	  to	  
Israel	  also	  leads	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  political	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  among	  young	  American	  
Jews.	  
	   The	  study	  first	  addresses	  how	  the	  trips	  affect	  political	  attitude,	  and	  it	  was	  
measured	  by	  how	  Jews	  who	  have	  been	  on	  a	  peer	  trip	  to	  Israel	  compared	  with	  like-­‐
minded	  Jews	  who	  have	  not	  been	  on	  a	  trip.	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  former	  travelers	  
to	  Israel	  were	  slightly	  more	  pro-­‐Israel	  in	  their	  political	  attitude	  than	  subjects	  who	  
have	  not	  traveled	  to	  Israel.	  In	  other	  words,	  subjects	  who	  have	  been	  on	  a	  trip	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  alter	  their	  political	  attitude	  (i.e.	  —	  liberalism	  versus	  conservatism)	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based	  on	  what	  they	  feel	  is	  best	  for	  Israel	  than	  their	  counterparts	  who	  have	  not	  been	  
on	  a	  trip.	  Explanations	  for	  such	  responses	  varied,	  though,	  and	  it	  did	  not	  appear	  that	  
political	  attitudes	  shifted	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  trip	  in	  any	  unified	  direction.	  Some	  
subjects	  indicated	  that	  they	  feel	  more	  conservative	  politically	  because	  conservative	  
politicians	  are	  generally	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  strong	  U.S.-­‐Israeli	  relations,	  whereas	  
liberals	  may	  be	  a	  bit	  more	  critical.	  Other	  subjects	  reported	  feeling	  more	  liberal	  
politically	  because	  they	  feel	  liberal	  politicians	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  push	  for	  a	  two-­‐state	  
solution,	  which	  they	  believe	  will	  offer	  a	  more	  stable	  and	  peaceful	  future	  for	  Israelis.	  
A	  third	  group	  of	  affected	  subjects	  did	  not	  move	  in	  any	  discernable	  direction,	  but	  its	  
members	  indicated	  that	  they	  felt	  more	  pro-­‐Israel	  and	  wanted	  to	  support	  Israel	  
through	  the	  American	  political	  arena.	  Ultimately,	  subjects	  who	  have	  gone	  on	  a	  trip	  
to	  Israel	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  their	  political	  attitudes	  affected	  in	  any	  of	  these	  
three	  ways	  than	  subjects	  who	  have	  not	  gone	  on	  a	  trip.	  
	   Next,	  the	  study	  determined	  how	  the	  trips	  affect	  political	  behavior,	  measured	  
by	  how	  Jews	  who	  have	  been	  on	  a	  trip	  to	  Israel	  vote	  in	  presidential	  elections	  
compared	  with	  like-­‐minded	  Jews	  who	  have	  not	  been	  on	  a	  trip.	  The	  results	  showed	  
that	  former	  travelers	  were	  no	  more	  likely	  than	  non-­‐travelers	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  their	  
views	  on	  Israel	  when	  they	  go	  to	  the	  polls.	  So,	  it	  appears	  that	  even	  though	  the	  trips	  
have	  an	  attitude	  effect,	  such	  a	  change	  does	  not	  manifest	  itself	  in	  a	  vote	  for	  a	  
particular	  type	  of	  politician.	  Additionally,	  it	  was	  less	  likely	  for	  an	  attitude	  effect	  to	  
lead	  to	  a	  behavioral	  effect	  in	  the	  less-­‐Jewish	  groups	  than	  in	  the	  more-­‐Jewish	  groups.	  
This	  is	  worth	  noting	  because	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  often	  looks	  for	  less-­‐Jewish	  
participants,	  since	  those	  are	  the	  Jews	  who	  are	  most	  in	  need	  of	  education	  via	  a	  trip	  to	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Israel.	  However,	  if	  the	  program’s	  underlying	  private	  goal	  is	  to	  have	  those	  Jews	  come	  
home	  and	  vote	  in	  ways	  that	  benefit	  Israel,	  this	  study	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  no	  major	  
payoff.	  The	  two	  most	  common	  explanations	  given	  for	  unaffected	  behavior	  was	  that	  
Israel	  has	  support	  from	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle,	  regardless	  of	  whose	  running	  for	  
president,	  and	  that	  domestic	  issues	  are	  simply	  more	  important	  than	  U.S.-­‐Israeli	  
relations.	  
	   Ultimately,	  this	  study	  is	  just	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  determining	  how	  Taglit-­‐
Birthright	  affects	  the	  U.S.	  political	  environment.	  The	  organization	  itself	  is	  still	  just	  13	  
years	  old	  and	  growing.	  As	  these	  trips	  become	  more	  common	  and	  slowly	  start	  to	  
become	  a	  major	  part	  of	  American	  Jewish	  identity,	  the	  political	  effects	  —	  especially	  
regarding	  behavior	  —	  may	  very	  well	  grow.	  Recently,	  U.S.-­‐Israeli	  relations	  are	  not	  as	  
tightly	  bound	  and	  unconditional	  as	  they	  were	  a	  few	  decades	  ago.	  At	  times,	  even	  
though	  the	  United	  States	  supports	  Israel’s	  right	  to	  defend	  itself,	  many	  politicians	  are	  
critical	  of	  Israel’s	  occupation	  of	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  Strip	  and	  are	  growing	  
impatient	  with	  Israel’s	  hesitance	  to	  consider	  diplomatic	  solutions	  with	  its	  neighbors.	  
What	  happens	  if	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  only	  
become	  more	  strained	  in	  the	  coming	  years?	  There	  were	  a	  number	  of	  subjects	  in	  this	  
study	  that	  indicated	  that	  if	  a	  politician	  running	  in	  a	  presidential	  election	  was	  openly	  
anti-­‐Israel,	  they	  would	  not	  vote	  for	  such	  a	  candidate.	  Today,	  such	  a	  condition	  has	  not	  
occurred,	  but	  in	  the	  future,	  the	  possibility	  of	  that	  condition	  would	  clearly	  affect	  
political	  behavior	  among	  American	  Jews.	  And	  American	  Jews	  who	  have	  been	  on	  a	  
Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trip	  to	  Israel	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  act	  on	  such	  a	  condition.	  So,	  who	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knows	  if	  or	  when	  the	  political	  effects	  of	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  will	  actually	  come	  to	  
fruition?	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Appendix	  
Below	  is	  the	  overall	  survey	  data.	  Seventy-­‐two	  survey	  responses	  were	  collected,	  
though	  not	  all	  subjects	  completed	  it	  in	  its	  entirety.	  Open-­‐ended	  questions	  are	  listed	  
here,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  charted.	  
ID	  questions:	  
1. What	  year	  are	  you	  in	  at	  U	  of	  M?	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3. Have	  you	  been	  confirmed?	  
	  
4. With	  which	  Jewish	  denomination	  do	  you	  most	  identify?	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6. Do	  you	  observe	  the	  High	  Holy	  Days	  and/or	  Passover?	  
	  
7. How	  involved	  have	  your	  parents	  been	  in	  your	  Jewish	  upbringing?	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9. Have	  you	  been	  on	  a	  Taglit-­‐Birthright	  trip	  to	  Israel	  (or	  another	  organized	  trip)?	  
	  
10. Please	  provide	  your	  Michigan	  uniqname.	  
	  
Jewish	  upbringing	  
11. Are	  your	  parents	  Jewish?	  
	  
12. How	  did	  you	  and	  your	  family	  observe	  Shabbat,	  if	  at	  all?	  
13. How	  did	  you	  and	  your	  family	  observe	  holidays	  like	  Rosh	  Hashanah,	  Yom	  Kippur,	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14. Did	  you	  attend	  Hebrew	  school	  growing	  up?	  
	  
Jewish	  upbringing,	  continued	  (if	  answer	  to	  14	  was	  no,	  15-­18	  were	  skipped)	  
15. Did	  you	  continue	  with	  your	  Hebrew	  education	  after	  the	  age	  of	  Bar/Bat	  Mitzvah?	  
	  
16. Was	  the	  continuation/discontinuation	  of	  your	  Hebrew	  education	  a	  personal	  choice	  
or	  did	  your	  parents	  influence	  your	  decision?	  Please	  explain.	  
	  




18. Did	  Hebrew	  School	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  your	  political	  beliefs?	  If	  so,	  
how?	  










	   66	  
	  
Jewish	  Social	  Life	  
19. Which	  are	  you	  registered	  with	  on	  campus?	  (Check	  all	  that	  apply.)	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21. Are	  you	  in	  a	  social	  fraternity	  or	  sorority	  with	  a	  Jewish	  affiliation	  or	  a	  primarily	  
Jewish	  membership?	  
	  
22. Does	  associating	  with	  other	  Jews	  on	  campus	  affect	  your	  religious	  
views/practices	  in	  any	  way?	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Israel	  
24. Have	  you	  ever	  been	  to	  Israel?	  
	  
Israel,	  continued	  (if	  answer	  to	  24	  was	  no,	  this	  page	  was	  skipped)	  
25. Was	  the	  trip	  organized	  by	  Taglit-­‐Birthright?	  
	  
26. Did	  the	  trip	  affect	  your	  commitment	  to	  Judaism	  in	  any	  way?	  If	  so,	  how?	  
27. Do	  you	  practice	  your	  Judaism	  in	  different	  ways	  since	  the	  trip?	  (Go	  to	  temple	  more	  
often	  or	  less	  often,	  observe	  holidays	  you	  previously	  did	  not,	  etc.)	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Political	  attitude/behavior,	  parents	  
29. How	  would	  you	  describe	  your	  mother’s	  political	  stance?	  
	  
30. How	  would	  you	  describe	  your	  father’s	  political	  stance?	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32. How	  supportive	  are	  your	  parents	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  in	  times	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East?	  (Please	  explain.)	  
	  
33. Do	  your	  parents	  consider	  U.S.	  support	  of	  Israel	  to	  be	  a	  minor	  or	  major	  political	  
issue?	  
	  
34. Do	  your	  parents’	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  their	  overall	  stance	  (i.e.	  —	  are	  they	  more	  
conservative/liberal	  overall	  because	  of	  their	  views	  on	  Israel?)	  Please	  explain.	  
	  
35. Do	  your	  parents’	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  their	  vote	  in	  national	  elections?	  If	  so,	  how?	  
	  
36. Why	  do	  you	  think	  Israel	  is	  important/unimportant	  to	  them	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  voting	  
in	  national	  elections?	  
	  
37. When	  your	  parents	  voice	  these	  opinions	  to	  you	  (concerning	  Israel),	  do	  they	  
encourage	  you	  to	  support	  the	  same	  viewpoints	  or	  do	  they	  encourage	  you	  to	  form	  


















Same	  Viewpoints	   Own	  Opinions	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Political	  attitude/behavior,	  subject	  
38. How	  would	  you	  describe	  your	  political	  stance?	  
	  
39. Does	  Judaism	  play	  a	  role	  in	  your	  political	  views?	  If	  so,	  how?	  
40. How	  supportive	  are	  you	  of	  Israel	  in	  times	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East?	  
	  
41. Do	  you	  consider	  U.S.	  support	  of	  Israel	  to	  be	  a	  minor	  or	  major	  political	  issue?	  
	  
42. Do	  your	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  your	  overall	  political	  stance	  (i.e.	  —	  are	  you	  more	  
conservative/liberal	  overall	  because	  of	  your	  views	  on	  Israel?)	  Please	  explain.	  
	  
43. Do	  your	  views	  on	  Israel	  affect	  your	  vote	  in	  national	  elections?	  If	  so,	  how?	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45. If	  you	  have	  been	  to	  Israel,	  have	  you	  altered	  your	  political	  views	  based	  on	  
information	  you	  learned	  on	  the	  trip,	  or	  based	  on	  a	  personal	  reaction	  from	  the	  trip?	  
If	  so,	  how?	  
	  
46. Are	  you	  more	  or	  less	  inclined	  to	  vote	  for	  a	  particular	  party	  in	  national	  elections	  
because	  of	  your	  views	  on	  Israel	  since	  the	  trip?	  Why?	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